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BOARD DIVERSITY SHAREHOLDER SUITS:
DIVERGING MATERIALITY TESTS UNDER
RULES 10B-5 AND 14A-9
John C Friess*

ABSTRACT
Environmental, social, and governance (ESG) investing has grown significantly
as an investment strategy over the past decade, leading to intensified demands
among investors for more ESG disclosures from publicly listed companies.
Perhaps the most high-profile example of this trend is the recent widespread
demand among institutional investors, proxy advisory firms, and exchanges for
more disclosure and compliance as it relates to board and workplace diversity.
Given these efforts and the signals coming from the SEC that it intends to take
a more proactive approach to ESG disclosure and compliance, issuers can
expect an environment of more specific and detailed diversity disclosures. These
increasingly comprehensive disclosures implicate the anti-fraud provisions of
the federal securities laws, particularly Rules 10b-5 and 14a-9. While the
Supreme Court has held that the materiality requirement under each of these
rules is identical, this note argues that, in the case of securities fraud claims
related to diversity disclosures, they require distinct evaluations and lead to
different outcomes. Specifically, Rule 14a-9, with its focus on what is important
to a reasonable investor’s voting decisions, is more favorable to plaintiffs than
Rule 10b-5, which regulates information important to a reasonable investor’s
buying and selling decisions. The divergent outcomes are due, in large part, to
the combined effects of ownership concentration, passive investing, and the
preference among investors for addressing ESG and diversity by voting their
shares rather than by selling them. As a result, this note finds that Rule 14a-9
is an increasingly viable option for claims against issuers for false or misleading
statements related to board diversity. Consequently, Rule 14a-9 may constitute
a mechanism by which plaintiffs can motivate compliance with board diversity
standards by making noncompliance too costly.

* J.D. Student, University of Michigan Law School. Email: jcfriess@umich.edu. A special
thank you to University of Michigan Law School Professors Vikramaditya S. Khanna and Adam C.
Pritchard for your guidance and feedback.
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INTRODUCTION
Environmental, social, and governance (ESG) investing has been a leading
focus in academic and professional circles for some time. The predominating
argument today is that ESG factors are financially material and, therefore, should
enter into investment decisions in order to minimize risk and maximize long-term
returns. 1 As this investment strategy has evolved, it has grown significantly in

1. See, e.g., Mozaffar Khan, George Serafeim & Aaron Yoon, Corporate Sustainability: First
Evidence on Materiality, 91 ACCT. REV. 1697 (2016); FOCUS ON ESG INTEGRATION, BLACKROCK (2020),
https://www.blackrock.com/cash/literature/investor-education/cash-management-focus-onesg-integration.pdf (“Accounting for ESG risks and opportunities makes us better investors.”);
but see Gunnar Friede, Timo Busch & Alexander Bassen, ESG and Financial Performance: Aggregated
Evidence from More than 2000 Empirical Studies, 5 J. SUSTAINABLE FIN. & INV. 210 (2015) (finding that,
while the majority of studies suggest a positive correlation between ESG and financial performance, others
find a zero or negative correlation).
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popularity and could be said to have garnered mainstream market acceptance.2
Despite the growing reliance on ESG, not all ESG information has been treated
the same. For many years, the “social” components of ESG have been considered
difficult to identify and incorporate. As a result, the “S” in ESG has taken a back
seat to the more tangible ESG factors, such as environmental sustainability. 3
The events of 2020 led to a swift reversal of this trend. Amidst the COVID19 pandemic and Black Lives Matter protests, investors have called into question
how companies handle issues of race and inclusion—as well as how companies
engage and manage relationships with key stakeholders, such as employees and
customers—during crises. 4 In particular, the demand among investors for more
corporate accountability with respect to diversity has been perhaps the most
prominent corporate-governance-related consequence of the events of 2020.
These efforts have been directed at facilitating more comprehensive disclosure of
diversity-related plans and metrics and have included warnings from institutional
investors that they will vote against boards of directors that fail to adequately
disclose or fail to maintain a minimum level of diversity at the board level. 5
The demands for more robust and standardized disclosure implicate federal
securities law and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). In fact, there
has been increasing pressure on the SEC to create a mandatory uniform disclosure
framework for ESG information. 6 While the SEC has traditionally pushed back
on these efforts, 7 the Commission under the Biden Administration has signaled

2. See, e.g., Rashi Kumar, Nathalie Wallace & Carlo Funk, State Street Global Advisors, Into
the Mainstream: ESG at the Tipping Point, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Jan. 13, 2020),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/01/13/into-the-mainstream-esg-at-the-tipping-point/.
3. See BNP PARIBAS, THE ESG GLOBAL SURVEY 2019 24 (2019) (finding that forty-six percent
of investors considered social factors to be the most difficult ESG factors to incorporate into investment
decisions); Jonathan Neilan, Peter Reilly & Glenn Fitzpatrick, FTI Consulting, Time to Rethink the S in
ESG, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (June 28, 2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020
/06/28/time-to-rethink-the-s-in-esg/: see generally SASB Materiality Map, SUSTAINABILITY ACCT.
STANDARDS BD., https://materiality.sasb.org/ (identifying a list of social issues that are likely to affect the
financial condition or operating performance of companies within an industry).
4. See, e.g., Geri Stengel, Black Lives Matter Protests Moves Corporate D&I Initiatives
Center Stage, FORBES (June 17, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/geristengel/2020/06
/17/black-lives-matter-protests-moves-corporate-di-initiatives-into-the-spotlight/; Why COVID-19
Could Prove to Be a Major Turning Point for ESG Investing, J.P. MORGAN (July 1, 2020),
https://www.jpmorgan.com/insights/research/covid-19-esg-investing.
5. See David M. Silk, Sebastian V. Niles & Carmen X. W. Lu, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen &
Katz, ESG and Sustainability: Key Considerations for 2021, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE (Jan. 30, 2021), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2021/01/30/esg-and-sustainabilitykey-considerations-for-2021/; see also Veronica Root Martinez & Gina-Gail S. Fletcher, Equality
Metrics, YALE L. J. (forthcoming 2021).
6. See, e.g., Alana L. Griffin, Michael J. Biles & Tyler J. Highful, Institutional Investors
Petition the SEC to Require ESG Disclosures, AM. BAR ASS’N. (Jan. 16, 2019),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/blt/2019/01/investors/.
7. Former SEC Chairman Jay Clayton stated that he believed that the current, principlesbased framework, which states that information should be disclosed if it is “material,” is preferable
to the blanket approach that has been proposed. See A Conversation with SEC Chairman Jay Clayton:
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that it intends to take a more proactive approach to ESG reporting, which will
likely include increased disclosure related to board diversity. 8 As a result, it is
almost inevitable that public companies will soon be required to make more
specific and comprehensive disclosures related to diversity, principally at the
board level. As such, they will become increasingly exposed to the federal
securities laws, in particular, Rules 10b-5 and 14a-9. 9
Rule 10b-5 prohibits fraud in the purchase or sale of securities. 10 More
precisely, Rule 10b-5 prohibits issuers from making any false or misleading
statements that can be reasonably expected to reach investors in the trading
markets. 11 Rule 14a-9 more narrowly prohibits false or misleading statements in
proxy statements. 12 These rules have a number of different elements that must
be shown at the pleadings stage; however, both rules require pleading that the
allegedly false or misleading statement is material. 13 This element has been
perhaps the biggest hurdle facing plaintiffs making securities fraud claims related
to ESG statements. 14 While the statutes explicitly refer to materiality, they do
not define “material,” which left the courts to define it on a case-by-case basis.

Long-term Investing, Sustainability, and the Role of Disclosures, FCLT GLOBAL (June 23, 2020),
https://www.fcltglobal.org/resource/jay-clayton-sec-webinar/.
8. See Public Statement, ESG Disclosure – Keeping Pace with Developments Affecting
Investors, Public Companies and the Capital Markets, John Coates, Acting Director, Division of
Corporation Finance (Mar. 11, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/coates-esgdisclosure-keeping-pace-031121 (describing that the SEC’s ESG policy going forward should include
an ESG-specific disclosure system); Allison Herren Lee, Acting Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n,
A Climate for Change: Meeting Investor Demand for Climate and ESG Information at the SEC, (Mar.
15, 2021) (transcript available at https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/lee-climate-change) (“[W]e must
also make progress on standardized ESG disclosure more broadly. That means working toward a
comprehensive ESG disclosure framework. In the near term, it should also include considering where
we can advance initiatives on a standalone basis now, such as offering guidance on human capital
disclosure to encourage the reporting of specific metrics like workforce diversity, and considering
more specific guidance or rulemaking on board diversity.”); Andrew Ross Sorkin et al., When Doing
Well Means Doing Good, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/15
/business/dealbook/sec-esg-priority.html (noting statements by SEC Chairman Gary Grensler in his
confirmation hearing as an indication that the SEC will likely implement a mandatory disclosure
regime for ESG issues).
9. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2015); id. § 240.14a-9.
10. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
11. Application of Antifraud Provisions to Public Statements of Issuers and Obligated Persons
of Municipal Securities in the Secondary Market: Staff Legal Bulletin No. 21 (OMS), SEC (Feb. 7,
2020) [hereinafter SEC Antifraud Provisions], https://www.sec.gov/municipal/application-antifraudprovisions-staff-legal-bulletin-21.
12. 15 U.S.C. § 78n (granting the SEC the authority to prescribe rules to govern the solicitation of
proxies). A proxy statement is a document provided by a company’s board of directors to its shareholders
ahead of an annual or a special shareholder meetings for the purpose of helping shareholders make informed
decisions about matters arising during a shareholder meeting. Alicia Tuovila, Proxy Statement, INVESTOPEDIA
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/proxystatement.asp (Aug. 8, 2021).
13. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b); id. § 240.14a-9(b).
14. See, e.g., In re BP P.L.C. Secs. Litig., 843 F. Supp. 2d 712, 775–76 (S.D. Tex. 2012)
(holding that BP’s sustainability disclosures were not material, as they consisted of “[g]eneralized,
positive statements about the company’s competitive strengths, experienced management, and future
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The standard for materiality in Rule 14a-9 was established by the Supreme
Court in TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway Inc, which held that a statement of fact
is material “if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would
consider it important in deciding how to vote.” 15 Later, in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson,
the Supreme Court expressly adopted this standard for Rule 10b-5 claims as
well. 16 This leads to an assumption that the materiality tests under Rules 10b-5
and 14a-9 should lead to similar conclusions. However, recent developments call
this assumption into question.
As a result of the changing investment strategies among institutional and
retail investors, securities fraud claims regarding diversity statements under
Rules 14a-9 and 10b-5 arrive at different outcomes with respect to the materiality
requirement. This is because materiality under Rule 10b-5 focuses on what a
reasonable investor considers to be important in the context of a buying or selling
decision, whereas Rule 14a-9 focuses on what a reasonable investor considers to
be important in the context of a voting decision. While there are many situations
in which a particular disclosure would be material to both a buying/selling and
voting decision, this is not the case for diversity disclosures. This is because
investors appear less likely to consider board diversity an important factor in their
decisions to buy or sell stock in a company, despite how outspoken institutional
and retail investors might be with respect to board diversity. This is evidenced,
in part, by the actions of ESG’s biggest proponents, the world’s largest asset
managers. These managers, including BlackRock, State Street Global Advisors,
and Vanguard Group, principally manage passive funds, the composition of
which they cannot alter according to diversity standards because the funds merely
track an index. 17 And, even in their active funds, these managers have not made
any firm commitments to buying or selling securities based on the degree of
diversity on company boards. Furthermore, among retail investors, while surveys
suggest that they believe ESG is important, there is no indication that they
prospects”); Bondali v. Yum! Brands, Inc., 620 Fed.Appx. 483, 490 (6th Cir. 2015) (holding that
Yum’s statements in its corporate Code of Conduct were not actionable because they are aspirational
rather than assertions of objective fact). Cf. David A. Hoffman, The Best Puffery Article Ever, 91
IOWA L. REV. 1395, 111 (2006) (stating that defendants have been increasingly successful in
obtaining dismissals based on puffery arguments, as evidenced by a study of 472 securities-law
decisions in New York federal courts).
15. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 439 (1976).
16. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 224 (1988) (holding that “the standard set forth in
[TSC], whereby an omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that its disclosure would
have been considered significant by a reasonable investor, is expressly adopted for the § 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 context”).
17. See David McLaughlin & Annie Massa, The Hidden Dangers of the Great Index Fund
Takeover, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 9, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news
/features/2020-01-09/the-hidden-dangers-of-the-great-index-fund-takeover. Instead of a fund
portfolio manager actively stock picking—that is, choosing securities to invest in and strategizing
when to buy and sell them—the index fund manager builds a portfolio whose holdings mirror the
securities of a particular index. Jason Fernando, Guide to Index Fund Investing, INVESTOPEDIA
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/i/indexfund.asp (Aug. 25, 2021). Therefore, portfolios of index
funds only substantially change when their benchmark indexes change. Id.
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consider board diversity in their decisions to buy and sell company stock.
Consequently, there is much more evidence to suggest that investors’ statements
in support of board diversity are costless, nonbinding, unverifiable “cheap talk,”
insofar as they relate to buying and selling decisions. 18 Therefore, this note
argues that disclosures related to board diversity would not be material under
Rule 10b-5.
However, due to Rule 14a-9’s focus on voting decisions, it is becoming
increasingly likely that disclosures related to board diversity are material under
Rule 14a-9. While investors have not shown a willingness to address board
diversity in buying and selling decisions, they are increasingly committing to
address diversity via director elections. 19 This is particularly true among
institutional investors who, due to massive inflows into passive funds, 20 now
account for approximately 80% of the shareholder base of publicly listed
companies in the U.S and, consequently, the overwhelming majority of
shareholder votes. 21 For example, State Street, which manages over $3 trillion,22
pledged in 2021 to vote against the Chair of the Nominating & Governance
Committee at companies in the S&P 500 and FTSE 100 that do not disclose the
racial and ethnic composition of their boards. 23 And, in 2022, State Street
pledged to vote against the Chair of the Nominating & Governance Committee
at companies in the S&P 500 and FTSE 100 that do not have at least one director
from an underrepresented community on their boards. 24 Likewise, Glass Lewis
and ISS, two proxy advisory firms that exert considerable influence on
shareholder voting, recently indicated that they will generally recommend voting

18. “Cheap talk” is a concept in game theory that refers to communication between players
that does not directly affect the payoffs of the game, meaning that it does not affect outcomes. See,
e.g., Vincent P. Crawford & Joel Sobel’s Strategic Information Transmission, 50 ECONOMETRICA
1431 (1982) (providing the seminal paper on “cheap talk”).
19. See Corporate Governance Quarterly Update, SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP (Feb. 18, 2021),
https://www.sullcrom.com/corporate-governance-quarterly-update-ESG-trends-board-diversity (explaining
the heightened focus on board diversity among institutional investors and proxy advisory firms).
20. See Jan Fichtner, Eelke M. Heemskerk & Javier Garcia-Bernardo, Hidden Power of the
Big Three? Passive Index Funds, Re-concentration of Corporate Ownership, and New Financial Risk,
19 BUS. & POL. 298, 298–300 (2017) (“Since the outbreak of the global financial crisis, private as
well as institutional investors have massively shifted capital from expensive, actively managed mutual
funds to cheap, index mutual funds and exchange traded funds. . . .”).
21. See 80% of Equity Market Cap Held by Institutions, PENSIONS & INVS. (Apr. 25, 2017,
1:00 AM) https://www.pionline.com/article/20170425/INTERACTIVE/170429926/80-of-equitymarket-cap-held-by-institutions.
22. See Billy Nauman, State Street to Insist Companies Disclose Diversity Data, FIN. TIMES (Jan.
10, 2021), https://www.ft.com/content/2e512c76-4733-4821-8425-136ab9b98426. For statistical
comparisons throughout this note, consider that the market capitalization for the New York Stock
Exchange, the largest stock exchange in the world, is about $26 trillion. New York Stock Exchange,
TRADINGHOURS.COM, https://www.tradinghours.com/markets/nyse.
23. Cyrus Taraporevala, CEO’s Letter on Our 2021 Proxy Voting Agenda, STATE ST. GLOB.
ADVISORS (Jan. 11, 2021), https://www.ssga.com/us/en/institutional/ic/insights/ceo-letter-2021proxy-voting-agenda.
24. Id.
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against directors at corporations that do not meet certain minimum board
diversity requirements. 25
These trends, among others to be discussed, represent a preference among
investors to address board diversity via engagement and voting rather than via the
“Wall Street walk.” 26 As such, they indicate that a securities fraud claim under
Rule 14a-9 for false or misleading diversity disclosures has a significantly better
chance of being considered material than a similar claim under Rule 10b-5.
Combined with the fact that Rule 14a-9 has no scienter requirement and a more
generous test for loss causation relative to Rule 10b-5, a shareholder suit under
Rule 14a-9 provides an increasingly viable option for plaintiffs seeking remedy
for false or misleading statements related to diversity. 27 This explains why
several of the first securities fraud class actions related to board diversity against
the likes of corporate giants Facebook, Oracle, and Qualcomm have been filed
pursuant Rule 14a-9. 28 While these claims do not address materiality using the
same approach discussed in this note, they are on the right track by utilizing the
most opportune rule. And, as the private sector proponents of ESG are joined by
the SEC in their efforts to enact mandatory, uniform more detailed ESG and
diversity disclosures, the materiality arguments made in such claims will gain
strength. As a result, Rule 14a-9 may soon provide a mechanism by which
plaintiffs can motivate compliance with board diversity standards by making
noncompliance too costly.
This note contributes to the literature by suggesting a novel interpretation of
the Supreme Court’s materiality standards under Rules 10b-5 and 14a-9 in the
25. See INST’L S’HOLDER SERV., UNITED STATES PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES 11–12 (2020), https://
www.issgovernance.com/file/policy/active/americas/US-Voting-Guidelines.pdf; GLASS L EWIS , 2021 PROXY
PAPER GUIDELINES 1 (2020), https://www.glasslewis.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/USVoting-Guidelines-GL.pdf?.
26. The “Wall Street Walk” refers to shareholders selling their shares outright when they are
unhappy with management rather than engaging with management to impact decisions within the
firm. See Anat R. Admati & Paul C. Pfleiderer, The ‘Wall Street Walk’ and Shareholder Activism:
Exit as a Form of Voice, 22 REV. OF FIN. STUD. 2645, 2646 (2009).
27. See infra Part III.A.
28. See Complaint, Klein v. Ellison, Case No. 20-cv-4439 (N.D. Cal. filed July 2, 2020);
Complaint, Ocegueda v. Zuckerberg, Case No. 20-cv-04444 (N.D. Cal. filed July 2, 2020); Kiger v.
Mollenkopf, No. 20-cv-01355-LAB-MDD (S.D. Cal. filed July 17, 2020); see also James E. Langston
et al., Shareholder Complaints Seek to Hold Directors Liable for Lack of Diversity, Cleary Gottlieb
(July 24, 2020), https://www.clearygottlieb.com/news-and-insights/publication-listing/shareholdercomplaints-seek-to-hold-directors-liable-for-lack-of-diversity. Ocegueda v. Zuckerberg is the first
ruling on a motion dismiss among cases seeking to hold corporate officers and directors accountable
for failing to deliver on diversity-related promises. Jay Godoy, Facebook Directors Get Diversity
Failure Lawsuit Tossed, REUTERS LEGAL (Mar. 22, 2021) https://www.reuters.com/article/securitiesfacebook-diversity/facebook-directors-get-diversity-failure-lawsuit-tossed-idUSL1N2LK2TF. The
case was dismissed, in part, on grounds that the plaintiffs failed to plead a materially false statement;
specifically, the Court found that Facebook’s statement that it is “committed to building a diverse
workforce” is aspirational and therefore immaterial. Order Granting Motion to Dismiss, Ocegueda v.
Zuckerberg, Case No. 20-cv-04444 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2021). However, as this note argues, as issuers
are increasingly pressured and potentially required to make more detailed disclosures related to
diversity, the likelihood of such disclosures being considered aspirational will decrease.
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context of ESG and diversity disclosures. 29 Furthermore, it reveals the practical
consequences of investor demands for ESG and diversity disclosure to the antifraud provisions of federal securities law. To date, the ESG literature has focused
primarily on the financial materiality of ESG factors and on ESG’s corporate
governance effects, without consideration of the direct implications of ESG on
federal securities fraud claims. 30 In addition, this note adds to the literature by
identifying the implications of passive investing and ownership concentration on
federal securities law. While the governance effects of passive investing and
ownership concentration have been well documented, these studies have not
considered the practical effects of these trends outside of a pure corporate
governance context. 31 In contrast, this note shows a very real and impending
consequence of ESG, passive investing, and ownership concentration to
securities class actions, which are the most litigated class action category in the
U.S.
Part I of this note provides a background of the rise of ESG, the demands
among investors for more ESG and diversity disclosures, and the federal
securities fraud laws implicated by these disclosures. Part II describes a novel
distinction between the materiality standards under Rules 10b-5 and 14a-9, which
are the anti-fraud provisions most relevant to diversity disclosures. Finally, Part
III addresses a number of other factors that make Rule 14a-9 the optimal antifraud provision for claims against issuers for false or misleading statements
related to board diversity.
I. ESG INVESTING, DISCLOSURE, AND SECURITIES FRAUD LIABILITY
A. Evolution of ESG Investing
While ESG’s recent widespread market acceptance may lead to a
misconception that it is a novel approach to investing, 32 the idea of integrating
29. This includes a reconsideration of the evolving definition of a reasonable investor, which
is also addressed by Saad & Strauss. See Aisha I. Saad & Diane Strauss, The New “Reasonable
Investor” and Changing Frontiers of Materiality: Increasing Investor Reliance on ESG Disclosures
and Implications for Securities Litigation, 17 BERKELEY BUS. L. J. 397 (2020).
30. See Khan et al., supra note 1; John C. Coffee, The Future of Disclosure: ESG, Common
Ownership, and Systemic Risk (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Law Working Paper No. 541/2020,
2021).
31. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Roberto Tallarita, The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder
Governance, 106 CORNELL L. REV. 91 (2020); see generally Jill E. Fisch, Assaf Hamdani & Steven
Davidoff Solomon, The New Titans of Wall Street: A Theoretical Framework for Passive Investors,
168 U. PENN. L. REV. 17 (2020); John C. Coates, IV, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I:
The Problem of Twelve (Harv. L. Sch. Program on Corp. Governance, Working Paper No. 19-07,
2018); Dorothy Shapiro Lund, The Case Against Passive Shareholder Voting, 43 J. OF CORP. L. 493
(2018).
32. See, e.g., George Kell, The Remarkable Rise of ESG, FORBES (July 11, 2018, 10:09 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/georgkell/2018/07/11/the-remarkable-rise-of-esg/?sh=71c776f16951
(inaccurately suggesting that the story of ESG investing began in 2004).
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personal values and societal concerns into investment decision-making is not
new. In fact, this approach to investing dates as far back as biblical times, in
which Jewish law laid down numerous requirements for investing ethically. It
continued through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when Quakers
avoided investing in enterprises that profited from products designed to kill or
enslave, and Methodists taught that ethical use of money was one of the most
important teachings in the New Testament. 33 Perhaps the best modern example
of religion’s influence on investment screening is the widespread avoidance of
“sin stocks,” which include corporations in industries such as alcohol, tobacco,
and gaming. 34
Values-based investing’s link to religion began to fade in the 1960s and 1970s
as ethical screens became primarily influenced by social activism as opposed to
religious doctrine and followed the principles of the broader social movements of
the era, such as the anti-Vietnam War and anti-Apartheid movements. 35
Furthermore, the new information regarding global warming that proliferated
during this time period moved environmental concerns to the forefront of socially
conscious investors’ minds, and the Chernobyl and Exxon Valdez catastrophes
in the 1980s further galvanized investors around values-based investing. 36 These
events are considered some of the major catalysts in the rise of socially
responsible investing (SRI), as this ethical screening process became formally
known. At the core of this investing philosophy is the belief that “business
organizations have societal obligations which transcend economic functions of
producing and distributing scarce goods and services and generating a
satisfactory level of profits for their shareholders.” 37 By 1999, the Social
Investment Forum reported that the total assets involved in socially responsible
investments worldwide had gone up from $40 billion in 1984 to $2.16 trillion.38
Despite this growing popularity, SRI was not considered a mainstream
investment strategy. 39 Instead, to traditional investors, SRI was considered a

33. Michael Monahan, The Ethics of Socially Responsible Investing, 21 BUS. & PROF. ETHICS
J. 27, 28 (2002); see Rabbi Lawrence Troster, Beyond the Letter of the Law: The Jewish Perspective
on Ethical Investing and Fossil Fuel Divestment, SOJOURNERS (Dec. 3, 2014), https://sojo.net/articles
/disinvest-reinvest/beyond-letter-law-jewish-perspective-ethical-investing-and-fossil-fuel.
34. Steve Schueth, Socially Responsible Investing in the United States, 43 J. BUS. ETHICS 189,
189–90 (2003).
35. See id. (“. . . the modern roots of social investing can be traced to the impassioned political
climate of the 1960s.”); Blaine Townsend, From SRI to ESG: The Origins of Socially Responsible
and Sustainable Investing, 1 J. IMPACT & ESG INV. at 2 (2020).
36. See Schueth, supra note 34, at 190; Townsend, supra note 35, at 6–7.
37. Edwin M. Epstein, Business Ethics, Corporate Good Citizenship and the Corporate Social
Policy Process: A View from the United States, 8 J. BUS. ETHICS 583, 585 (1989).
38. Steve Schueth, Alisa Gravitz & Todd Larsen, 1999 Report on Socially Responsible
Investing Trends in the United States, Social Investment Forum (Nov. 4, 1999), https://
www.griequity.com/resources/InvestmentIndustry/Trends/SIF%20Research%201999%20Trends%
20Report.htm.
39. See id. (noting that socially and environmentally responsible investing accounts for about
13 percent of the total investment assets under professional management in the United States in 1999).

164

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

[Vol. 11:1

trade-off of “value for values,” meaning that SRI sacrifices returns in exchange
for a portfolio of investments that aligns with one’s personal values, and so it
lacked conventional appeal. 40
ESG investing evolved out of SRI in the 2000s. While SRI’s investment
screens are still popular, ESG’s new formulation of socially conscientious
investing has a distinguishing characteristic that has led ESG, as distinct from
SRI, to widespread market acceptance. This unique characteristic is best
exemplified by the investing approach purported at BlackRock, the world’s
largest asset manager with $8.7 trillion in assets under management (AUM) 41 and
one of ESG’s most vocal and powerful proponents. BlackRock, which
committed to making all active portfolios and advisory strategies fully “ESG
integrated” by the end of 2020, explains that by integrating this non-financial but
material information, it will be better positioned to understand a company’s longterm risk and return prospects. 42 As Larry Fink, Chairman and CEO of
BlackRock, in reference to the “E” in ESG, further specified, “I am not doing this
for environmental reasons – I am a fiduciary responsible for other people’s money
and climate change is affecting their investments.” 43 Cyrus Taraporevala, CEO
and President of State Street, made similar statements with respect to diversity,
stating, “Diversity is an issue I am sure we all care about from a values
perspective—but it is also recognized to have a material impact on companies
and investors from a value perspective.” 44 Taraporevala reiterated, in regards to

40. See Robert G. Eccles & Svetlana Klimenko, The Investor Revolution, HARV. BUS. REV.
(Apr. 13, 2019), https://hbr.org/2019/05/the-investor-revolution (“Many corporate managers still
equate sustainable investing with its predecessor, socially responsible investing (SRI), and believe
that adhering to its principles entails sacrificing some financial return in order to make the world a
better place.”); Pippa Stevens, Your Complete Guide to Investing with a Conscience, a $30 Trillion
Market Just Getting Started, CNBC (Dec. 14, 2019, 8:15 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/12/14
/your-complete-guide-to-socially-responsible-investing.html (“[Socially responsible investment
strategies were] once a niche approach thought to come at the expense of return.”); Katherina Glac,
Understanding Socially Responsible Investing: The Effect of Decision Frames and Trade-off Options,
87 J. BUS. ETHICS 41, 42 (2009) (explaining that socially responsible investors have a higher
acceptance for return differentials between conventional and screened investments when compared
to traditional investors, suggesting that socially responsible investors derive utility from non-financial
characteristics of their investments).
41. Michael Mackenzie, BlackRock Assets Surge to Record $8.68tn, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 14,
2021), https://www.ft.com/content/53b35fee-a8c3-4a18-85ef-d7f2527d0ba0.
42. What is ESG Investing?, ISHARES BY BLACKROCK, https://www.ishares.com/ch
/institutional/en/themes/sustainable-investing/esg-explained (“ESG metrics can provide investors
with a rules-based, transparent mechanism for identifying companies that may be prone to major
controversies and can subsequently help investors seek less portfolio volatility over time.”).
43. Gillian Tett, Wall Street’s New Mantra: Green is Good, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2021),
https://www.ft.com/content/e5b57ece-0c31-4f42-9229-c8981bc9fd34?shareType=nongift; see also
ESG Integration, BLACKROCK, https://www.blackrock.com/ch/individual/en/themes/sustainableinvesting/esg-integration (stating that BlackRock’s ESG integration policy is not “a values-based
exercise”).
44. Cyrus Taraporevala, Race & Ethnicity and the Role of Asset Stewardship, HARV. L. SCH.
F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Mar. 27, 2021), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2021/03/27/raceethnicity-and-the-role-of-asset-stewardship/.
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ESG, “For us, it’s very important that you understand that this work has been
about value, not values.” 45 What is clear about this approach to ESG investing,
which is emulated by major institutions and retail investors alike, 46 is that ESG
factors are relevant because they help investors manage risk exposure. In contrast
to SRI, which distinctly prioritizes investment screens over shareholder returns
in order to align one’s investments with one’s values, ESG investing purports to
incorporate environmental, social, and governance factors into traditional Wall
Street risk-return analyses in order to maximize long-term returns. 47 However,
in order to fully integrate ESG into investment strategies, investors are
demanding access to company-specific ESG information. This has resulted in
efforts by the investment community to mandate disclosure of ESG metrics and,
in particular, diversity metrics and benchmarks. 48
B. Diversity Disclosures
Despite the dramatic rise of ESG investing strategies in recent years,
companies have struggled to fully understand and implement the “S” in ESG,
representing the “social” characteristics of a company. These include, for
example, human rights, workplace health and safety, diversity and inclusion, and
product safety and quality. 49 Notwithstanding these issues, social factors have
45. Id; see also Cyrus Taraporevala, CEO’s Letter on Our 2020 Proxy Voting Agenda, STATE
ST. GLOB. ADVISORS (Jan. 28, 2020), https://www.ssga.com/library-content/pdfs/insights/CEOsletter-on-SSGA-2020-proxy-voting-agenda.pdf (“Ultimately, [State Street] has a fiduciary
responsibility to [its] clients to maximize the probability of attractive long-term returns. This is why
we are so focused on financially material ESG issues.”).
46. See, e.g., STATE ST. GLOB. ADVISORS, ESG INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR SURVEY 6, 11, 20 (2017),
https://www.ssga.com/investment-topics/environmental-social-governance/2017/esg-institutional-investorsurvey-us.PDF (finding that, across a broad range of institutional investors, 80% of respondents reported
having an ESG component as part of their investment strategies, with 68% reporting that integration of ESG
had significantly improved returns); ALLIANZ GLOB. INVS., SUSTAINABLE INVESTING REPORT 2019 22
(2019), https://us.allianzgi.com/-/media/allianzgi/globalagi/documents/esg/allianzgi-sustainability-report-2019.pdf.
(explaining that 75% of respondents in a survey of retail investors reported interest in sustainable investing).
47. See, e.g., Townsend, supra note 35, at 7 (“To institutional investors, ESG analytics
promised to help identify long-term risk factors and/or identify investment opportunities based on
these risks. ESG focused on risks that were likely not factored into traditional Wall Street analysis.”).
Investment valuation is fundamentally concerned with the magnitude and risk of future cash flows.
This is exemplified by discounted cash flow analysis (DCF), which is the valuation method that gets
the most play in academia and comes with the best theoretical credentials. See Aswath Damodaran,
Valuation Approaches and Metrics: A Survey of the Theory and Evidence, 1 FOUNDS. & TRENDS IN
FIN. 693, 696 (2005); see generally Jason Fernando, Discounted Cash Flow (DCF), INVESTOPEDIA
(Sept. 12, 2021), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/dcf.asp. Accordingly, if ESG factors affect
the magnitude of an investment’s risks or future cash flows, as is suggested by its proponents, then it
is an important component in investment valuation.
48. These demands are not universal. See, e.g., Eric Platt & Myles McCormick, Berkshire
Hathaway Opposes Shareholder Call for Climate Disclosures, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 15, 2021),
https://www.ft.com/content/adb9bf15-92f1-4302-ad9d-7cc0eadc2d0d (describing that Warren
Buffet’s Berkshire Hathaway told investors that it does not consider a formal, mandatory evaluation
of how it manages climate-related risk as “necessary”).
49. See Neilan et al., supra note 3; SUSTAINABILITY ACCT. STANDARDS BD., supra note 3.
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been thrust into the spotlight with the events of 2020, including the COVID-19
pandemic and Black Lives Matter protests, which have called into question how
companies handle issues of race and inclusion, as well as how companies engage
and manage relationships with key stakeholders, such as employees and
customers, during crises. 50 Amidst these issues, it is becoming increasingly
apparent to companies and investors that social issues present real risks for
companies and are every bit as relevant as environmental or governance risks. 51
With this heightened awareness has come a dramatic increase in demand for
tangible benchmarks and disclosures concerning how companies are addressing
social issues. 52 Of the social factors receiving increased attention, diversity and
inclusion has experienced the most demand for more comprehensive disclosure.
However, the SEC has traditionally pushed back on efforts to set up a mandatory
ESG disclosure regime. The agency stated that it believes the current, principlesbased disclosure requirements, with their focus on materiality, are adequate in
addressing ESG disclosures, in the same way they address traditional, financialoriented disclosures. 53 According to former SEC Chairman, Jay Clayton, instead
of lumping all ESG-related disclosures together into a rigid set of standards
applied the same way across all public companies, the SEC’s commitment should
remain “rooted in materiality.” 54 In light of these statements, public companies

50. See, e.g., Tracy Jan et al., As Big Corporations Say ‘Black Lives Matter,’ Their Track Records
Raise Skepticism, WASH. POST. (Jun. 13, 2020, 7:21 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business
/2020/06/13/after-years-marginalizing-black-employees-customers-corporate-america-says-black-livesmatter/; Lynn S. Paine, Covid-19 Is Rewriting the Rules of Corporate Governance, HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct.
6, 2020), https://hbr.org/2020/10/covid-19-is-rewriting-the-rules-of-corporate-governance.
51. See Neilan et al., supra note 3 (stating that “factors relating to ‘S’ are now among the most
pressing issues for companies globally”).
52. See, e.g., Dylan Bruce & Peter Rasmussen, Analysis: Mandated Board Diversity Takes
Center Stage in 2021, BLOOMBERG L. (Nov. 16, 2020, 8:31 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com
/bloomberg-law-analysis/analysis-mandated-board-diversity-takes-center-stage-in-2021.
53. See William Hinman, Dir., Sec. Exch. Comm’n Div. of Corp. Fin., Applying a
Principles-Based Approach to Disclosing Complex, Uncertain and Evolving Risks (Mar. 15,
2019), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/hinman-applying-principles-based-approach-disclosure031519. There are some exceptions to this stance. For example, Item 407(c)(2)(vi) of Regulation
S-K requires a description of the nominating committee’s process for identifying and evaluating
nominees for director, including whether and how the committee or the board considers diversity.
See 17 CFR § 229.407(c)(2)(vi); Brian V. Breheny et al., SEC Staff Issues Interpretive Guidance
on Board Diversity Disclosures, SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP AND AFFILIATES
(Feb. 12, 2019), https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2019/02/sec-staff-issuesinterpretive-guidance-on-board. Regulation S-K also requires registrants to report environmental
penalties exceeding a certain threshold. 17 C.F.R. § 229.103.
54. Jay Clayton, Chairman, Sec. Exch. Comm’n, Statement on Proposed Amendments to
Modernize and Enhance Financial Disclosures, Other Ongoing Disclosure Modernization Initiatives;
Impact of the Coronavirus; Environmental and Climate-Related Disclosure (Jan. 30, 2020),
https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/clayton-mda-2020-01-30; see Jay Clayton, Chairman,
Sec. Exch. Comm’n, Public Statement, Remarks at Meeting of the Investor Advisory Committee,
(Mar. 28, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/clayton-remarks-investor-advisorycommittee-032819.
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should continue to disclose ESG-related information, as they do all information,
to the extent that it presents a material risk to the company’s business.
The SEC’s hands-off approach led to several high-profile efforts among
private enterprises to influence companies to disclose more diversity metrics. For
example, State Street’s Taraporevala, citing racial and ethnic diversity as one of
State Street’s main stewardship priorities for 2021, has directed the firm’s $3.1
trillion investment arm to vote against the directors at companies in the S&P 500
and FTSE 100 that do not disclose the racial and ethnic composition of their
boards. 55 In addition, State Street committed to voting against directors at
companies in the S&P 500 and FTSE 100 that do not have at least one director
from an underrepresented community on their boards. 56 State Street also notified
board members of its portfolio companies that it expects disclosure of their
specific goals and strategy related to racial and ethnic representation on their
boards of directors and in the companies’ workforces. 57 BlackRock, Vanguard
and the NYC Comptroller’s Office have introduced similar measures. 58
Proxy advisory firms ISS and Glass Lewis, who together control over 90%
of the proxy service market, 59 have also addressed diversity in their 2021 voting
recommendations. In regards to gender diversity, companies with no women on
their boards will receive an adverse vote recommendation from ISS. 60 In
addition, ISS will highlight in its research reports those boards that lack racial
and/or ethnic diversity and, starting in 2022, will issue adverse vote
recommendations, generally voting against or withholding “from the chair of the
nominating committee (or other directors on a case-by-case basis) where the
board has no apparent ethnically or racially diverse members.” 61 In addition,
Glass Lewis will recommend voting against the nominating committee chair of a
Taraporevala, supra note 23.
See id.
STATE STREET GLOBAL ADVISORS, GUIDANCE ON ENHANCING RACIAL & ETHNIC
DIVERSITY DISCLOSURES 1-2 (2021), https://www.ssga.com/library-content/pdfs/asset-stewardship
/racial-diversity-guidance-article.pdf/.
58. See VANGUARD, INVESTMENT STEWARDSHIP 2020 ANNUAL REPORT 24–29 (2020),
https://about.vanguard.com/investment-stewardship/perspectives-and-commentary/2020_investment
_stewardship_annual_report.pdf (stating that Vanguard will begin to ask companies to disclose the
diversity makeup of their boards); BLACKROCK, BLACKROCK INVESTMENT STEWARDSHIP PROXY
VOTING GUIDELINES FOR U.S. SECURITIES 6 (2020), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature
/fact-sheet/blk-responsible-investment-guidelines-us.pdf (“To the extent that a company has not
adequately accounted for diversity in its board composition within a reasonable timeframe, based on
our assessment, we may vote against members of the nominating/governance committee for an
apparent lack of commitment to board effectiveness.”); Scott M. Stringer, N.Y.C. Comptroller, The
City of New York Office of the Comptroller, Remarks at the Bureau of Asset Management “Emerging
Managers and MWBE Managers Conference” (Oct. 11, 2019), https://comptroller.nyc.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2019/10/10.11.19-SMS-BAM-remarks_distro.pdf.
59. Chong Shu, The Competitive Landscape of the Proxy Advice Market, THE CLS BLUE SKY
BLOG (June 25, 2020), https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2020/06/25/the-competitive-landscapeof-the-proxy-advice-market/.
60. INST’L S’HOLDER SERV., supra note 25, at 11–12.
61. Id. at 12.
55.
56.
57.
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board that has fewer than two female directors. 62 Furthermore, Glass Lewis will
evaluate disclosures in the proxy statement relating to board diversity in order to
inform its assessment of a company’s overall governance and potentially serve as
a contributing factor for recommendations. 63 These actions are significant given
the influence proxy advisors have over voting behavior in public companies. 64
C. Nasdaq’s Comply-or-explain Requirement
Nasdaq, using its leverage as an exchange to address the issues of diversity
and inclusion, submitted a proposal in December 2020 to the SEC requesting that
the Commission permit the exchange to adopt new listing rules related to board
diversity and disclosure. 65 These rules would require all companies listed on
Nasdaq’s U.S. exchange to disclose diversity statistics regarding their board of
directors. In addition, the rules would require most Nasdaq-listed companies to
have, or explain why they do not have, at least two diverse directors, including
one who self-identifies as female and one who self-identifies as either an
underrepresented minority or LGBTQ+. 66 Currently, only about one in three
companies listed on the Nasdaq exchange would meet this criteria. 67 Nasdaq
expressed to the SEC that a primary goal of the proposal is to further the
objectives of the Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934
Acts by removing impediments to the free and open market, preventing
fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices, and protecting investors and the
public interest. Nasdaq also emphasized the strong link between diversity and
financial performance, which has been supported in the academic and
professional literature. 68

62. GLASS LEWIS, 2021 PROXY PAPER GUIDELINES, supra note 25, at 1.
63. Id.
64. See, e.g., James R. Copland, David F. Larcker & Brian Tayan, The Big Thumb on the Scale:
An Overview of the Proxy Advisory Industry, STAN. CLOSER LOOK SERIES 3–4 (May 30, 2018),
https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/publication-pdf/cgri-closer-look-72-big-thumb-proxyadvisory.pdf.
65. See Nasdaq to Advance Diversity Through New Proposed Listing Requirements, NASDAQ (Dec.
1, 2020), https://www.nasdaq.com/press-release/nasdaq-to-advance-diversity-through-new-proposed-listingrequirements-2020-12-01; The Nasdaq Stock Market LLC, Proposed Rule Change (Form 19b-4) (Dec. 1,
2020) [hereinafter Nasdaq Proposed Rule Change] https://listingcenter.nasdaq.com/assets/RuleBook/Nasdaq
/filings/SR-NASDAQ-2020-081.pdf.
66. Nasdaq to Advance Diversity Through New Proposed Listing Requirements, supra note
65.
67. Nauman, supra note 22.
68. See Nasdaq Proposed Rule Change, supra note 65, at 9–10. Though, the literature is not
conclusive in regards to the correlation between board diversity and financial performance, which
Nasdaq also recognizes in its proposal. Compare Gennaro Bernile, Vineet Bhagwat & Scott Yonker,
Board Diversity, Firm Risk, and Corporate Policies, 127 J. FIN. ECON. 588 (2018) (finding that
greater diversity on boards—including gender, ethnicity, educational background, age, financial
expertise and board experience—is associated with increased operating performance, higher asset
valuation multiples, lower stock return volatility, reduced financial leverage, increased dividend
payouts to shareholders, higher investment in R&D and better innovation) and Meggin Thwing
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In accordance with the comply-or-explain requirement, a company
explaining why it does not have two diverse directors must provide the
explanation in the company’s proxy statement or information statement for its
annual meeting of shareholders or on the company’s website. 69 Nasdaq would
not assess the substance of the company’s explanation, but would verify that the
company has provided one. 70 However, explanations such as “the Company does
not comply with the diversity rule” would not satisfy the requirement. 71 Rather,
the company should provide something akin to the following: “The Company is
required to have at least two diverse directors. The Company has chosen to
satisfy this rule by explaining its reasons for not meeting the diversity objectives
of the rule, which the Company has set forth below.” 72 Nasdaq provided
examples of possible reasons in its proposal. For instance, the company may
choose to explain that it does not meet the diversity objectives because it is
subject to an alternative standard under foreign laws, or it “has a board philosophy
regarding diversity that differs from the diversity objectives set forth in the
rule.” 73
Comply-or-explain requirements such as these are commonplace across
Europe, where they serve as the foundation for corporate governance law. 74
However, this technique has generally failed to gain traction in the United States,
with the most notable exception being Section 406 of the Sarbannes-Oxley Act
of 2002, which requires firms to disclose whether they have a code of ethics for
Eastman, Damion Rallis & Gaia Mazzucchelli, The Tipping Point: Women on Boards and Financial
Performance, MSCI (2016) (finding that U.S. companies with at least three women on the board in
2011 experienced higher median gains in return on equity and earnings-per-share than companies that
had no female directors) and MCKINSEY & COMPANY, DIVERSITY WINS: HOW INCLUSION MATTERS
13 (2020) (finding a positive, statistically significant correlation between company performance and
board diversity on the dimensions of both gender and ethnicity) with Isabelle Solal & Kaisa Snellman,
Why Investors React Negatively to Companies That Put Women on Their Boards, HARV. BUS. REV.
(Nov. 25, 2019), https://hbr.org/2019/11/why-investors-react-negatively-to-companies-that-putwomen-on-their-boards (describing study that found that companies that appoint women to the board
see decline in their market value for two years following the appointment) and Alice H. Eagly, When
Passionate Advocates Meet Research on Diversity, Does the Honest Broker Stand a Chance?, 72 J.
SOC. ISSUES 199 (2016) (concluding that research findings are mixed and studies yielding positive
correlations are null or extremely small with respect to board gender diversity and company financial
performance) and David Carter et al., The Gender and Ethnic Diversity of US Boards and Board
Committees and Firm Financial Performance, 18 CORP. GOVERNANCE: INT’L REV. 396 (2010)
(finding no relationship between gender diversity or ethnic minority diversity and financial
performance).
69. Nasdaq Proposed Rule Change, supra note 65, at 61.
70. Id. at 63.
71. Id.
72. See id.
73. Id. at 14.
74. See Eddy Wymeersch, Enforcement of Corporate Governance Codes 7 (Euro. Corp.
Governance Inst. Law Working Paper No. 46/2005, 2005); Andrew Keay, Comply-or-explain in
Corporate Governance Codes: In Need of Greater Regulatory Oversight?, 34 LEGAL STUD. 279, 279
(2014) (“At the heart of the voluntary corporate governance code in the UK and elsewhere is the
concept of ‘comply-or-explain’”).
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senior officers or to explain why they do not. 75 Observers in Europe emphasize
the fact that comply or explain requirements utilize market enforcement as means
of promoting good governance and informed markets. 76 For instance, if the
statements associated with the requirements appear untrue or are misleading,
consequences may follow. These consequences may take the form of reputational
damages that manifest in sold shares or proxy contests; but they can also take the
form of legal liability, especially in the United States where securities class
actions are much more prevalent. 77 The risk of legal liability is particularly
relevant in the context of diversity disclosures because diversity information, due
to its nonfinancial nature, is not of the type that securities law has been designed
to address. Therefore, there is significant uncertainty from a legal liability
perspective regarding how diversity information will be treated in the courts once
public companies are effectively required to disclose information related to board
diversity plans and benchmarks.
Nasdaq’s proposal, together with the efforts of institutional investors, proxy
advisory firms, and exchanges, represents a rapid and substantial shift in
emphasis among ESG factors. Social issues, which were previously considered
too intangible to deserve much focus, are now a priority, and the market is
sending signals to issuers that it expects them to increase diversity disclosures
and meet diversity benchmarks, or potentially face repercussions. Furthermore,
despite its persistent reluctance to initiate a separate disclosure regime for ESG
factors, the SEC under the Biden Administration has finally joined these efforts
and expressed its intention to take a more proactive approach to ESG, making the
approval of Nasdaq’s proposal or the enactment of similar measures by the SEC
increasingly likely. 78 These trends indicate that more specific and voluminous
diversity disclosures, especially as it relates to board diversity, are an inevitability
for publicly listed companies in the U.S. As a result, these companies should
expect greater exposure to the federal securities fraud laws.
D. SEC Disclosure Regulations and Anti-Fraud Provisions
The importance of disclosing accurate and adequate information in securities
markets is well documented. 79 One of the most essential benefits of disclosure is
that it protects investors, particularly unsophisticated investors, from fraudulent,
opportunistic behavior by insiders with access to private information. Disclosure
produces this benefit by providing the entire investing public with the information
75.
76.
77.

Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–204 § 406(a)–(b), 116 Stat. 745, 789.
See, e.g., Wymeersch, supra note 74, at 8.
See DAVID H. KISTENBROKER, JONI S. JACOBSON & ANGELA M. LIU, DECHERT LLP,
GLOBAL SECURITIES LITIGATION TRENDS 15 (2020) (describing the U.S. as the leader in securities in
securities and collective litigation),
78. See Sorkin, supra note 8.
79. See generally Paul M. Healy & Krishna G. Palepu, Information Asymmetry, Corporate
Disclosure and the Capital Markets: A Review of the Empirical Disclosure Literature, 31 J. OF ACCT.
& ECON. 405 (2001).
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necessary to determine the risk-return prospects of any given company. If a
publicly traded company truthfully discloses to the investing public the companyspecific details needed to make this determination, then corporate insiders or
investment professionals with access to superior information absent disclosure
are not able to take advantage of this information asymmetry to the detriment of
outside investors. 80 As a result, investor confidence is enhanced, thus preserving
the well-functioning, if not the very existence, of the securities markets. 81
Since the Securities Act of 1933, the federal government has regulated
information disclosure in securities markets. 82 In order to facilitate effective
disclosure, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 created the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) and empowered it to require periodic disclosures
of information by publicly-traded companies and to discipline market actors for
false or misleading statements and omissions in relation to such disclosures. 83 By
utilizing these tools, the SEC ensures that investors have the “timely, accurate,
and complete information they need to make confident and informed decisions
about when and where to invest.” 84
In addition to determining disclosure regimes for public companies, the SEC
is tasked with enforcing federal securities laws. This includes enforcement of
anti-fraud provisions, which prohibit false or misleading statements or omissions
by participants in the securities markets. However, via a private right of action,
80. This is a formulation of the efficient markets hypothesis (ECMH). The seminal article on
ECMH as a legal construct is Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market
Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984). The theory states that a variety of forces impound available
information into stock prices fast enough that arbitrage opportunities cannot be exploited
systematically. Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and Securities Regulation: Market
Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PENN. L. REV. 851, 851 (1992). In other words, share prices reflect all
public information, so that no one with public information can consistently beat the market. The
theory has been very influential within the SEC and in the courts. For example, the Supreme Court
effectively endorsed ECMH in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1998). In addition, Judge Frank
Easterbrook has written that “[t]he [SEC] believes that markets correctly value the securities of wellfollowed firms, so that new sales may rely on information that has been digested and expressed in the
security’s price.” Wielgos v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 892 F.2d 509, 510 (7th Cir. 1989) (emphasis
added). The SEC’s approach to insider trading prosecutions, exemplified by former SEC enforcement
director Robert Khuzami’s statement that the SEC canvasses the hedge fund industry looking for
funds with “aberrational performance,” further exemplifies the prominence of EMH as an explanatory
theory. See Roger Lowenstein, The War on Insider Trading: Market-Beaters Beware, N.Y. TIMES
MAG. (Sept. 22 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/25/magazine/in-the-insider-trading-warmarket-beaters-beware.html?.
81. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a. See also Luca Enriques & Sergio Gilotta,
Disclosure and Financial Market Regulation, (The Oxford Handbook of Fin. Regul., Working Paper
No. 252, 2014).
82. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a. The Securities Act of 1933 deals primarily
with registration and disclosures of securities issuances, whereas the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
regulates securities transactions in secondary markets.
83. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C § 78d, 78r.
84. See Daniel M. Gallagher, The Importance of the SEC Disclosure Regime, HARV. L. SCH.
F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (July 15, 2013), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/07/16/theimportance-of-the-sec-disclosure-regime/; What We Do, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/about/what-wedo (last visited Jan. 19, 2021).
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private investors defrauded in the securities markets are also able to enforce antifraud provisions. 85 For the purpose of this note, the two most notable provisions
giving rise to private rights of action for fraudulent statements made by public
companies are Rules 10b-5 and 14a-9. 86
1. Rule 10b-5
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 prohibits fraud in the
purchase or sale of securities. Specifically, the statute states, “It shall be unlawful
for any person . . . [t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security, . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance . . . .” 87
Pursuant to its authority granted under this statute, the SEC promulgated Rule
10b-5. Rule 10b-5 is considered the catch-all anti-fraud provision of the federal
securities laws, and the Supreme Court determined that it can be enforced via an
implied private right of action. 88 As such, it represents the most widely-used
securities anti-fraud provision for private plaintiffs and is considered the most
significant regulatory consequence of the ‘34 Act. 89 Rule 10b-5 states the
following:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. 90

Based upon this provision, the courts have established elements of a cause of
action under Rule 10b-5, in which “[p]laintiffs bear the burden of showing: (1) a
material misstatement, (2) scienter, (3) reliance, and (4) loss causation.” 91

85. See generally John A. Maher, Implied Private Rights of Action and the Federal Securities
Laws: A Historical Perspective, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 783 (1980) (describing the history of private
rights of action in the context of the Securities Acts’ anti-fraud provisions).
86. 17 CFR § 240.10b-5 (2021); 17 CFR § 240.14a-9 (2021).
87. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (emphasis added).
88. See STEPHEN J. CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION CASES AND
ANALYSIS 111 (5th ed. 2019); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 731–32 (1975);
Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375 (1983) (describing Section 10(b) as a “catchall”
antifraud provision).
89. See CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 88, at 111, 243.
90. 17 CFR § 240.10b-5 (2021) (emphasis added).
91. CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 88, at 273.
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First, a plaintiff must plead that a misstatement or omission is material. 92
According to the Supreme Court in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, materiality “depends
on the significance the reasonable investor would place on the withheld or
misrepresented information.” 93 More specifically, to fulfill the materiality
requirement, “there must be a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the
omitted fact [or accurate disclosure of a misrepresented fact] would have been
viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’
of information available.” 94 By referencing a theoretical “reasonable investor,”
the Supreme Court established an objective materiality test that must be satisfied
by the plaintiff. 95
Second, a plaintiff must plead scienter. In the context of a Rule 10b-5 action,
“‘scienter’ refers to a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or
defraud.” 96 The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) and
Rule 9(b) require plaintiffs to plead scienter with particularity. 97 Specifically, the
PSLRA requires that pleadings give rise to a “strong inference” of scienter. The
Supreme Court has determined that a “strong inference” of scienter in a securities
fraud complaint is something more than “reasonable” or “permissible;” instead,
a “strong inference” must be “cogent and compelling . . . in light of other
explanations.” 98 Essentially, in an attempt to deter frivolous securities lawsuits,
the PSLRA and the subsequent definition of “strong inference” established by the
Supreme Court created a heightened pleading standard for scienter that must be
met by private plaintiffs.
Third, a plaintiff must plead reliance. In Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, the Supreme
Court held that there is a presumption of reliance upon misstatements made by a
corporation under a fraud-on-the-market theory. 99 This theory posits that “in an
open and developed securities market, the price of a company’s stock is
determined by the available material information regarding the company in its
business.” 100 Accordingly, misleading statements will defraud purchasers and
sellers of stock even if the purchasers and sellers do not directly rely on the

92. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 563 U.S. 27 (2011).
93. 485 U.S. at 240.
94. Id. at 231–32 (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)).
95. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 445 (1976) (“The question of
materiality, it is universally agreed, is an objective one, involving the significance of an omitted or
misrepresented fact to a reasonable investor.”)
96. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.12 (1976).
97. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2021); Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
98. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322, 324 (2007) (holding that
the inquiry under the PSLRA pleading requirements for scienter is “whether all of the facts alleged,
taken collectively, give rise to a strong inference of scienter, not whether any individual allegation,
scrutinized in isolation, meets that standard”).
99. 485 U.S. 224, 250 (1988). The Supreme Court in Basic effectively adopted the efficient
capital markets hypothesis (ECMH). See Kistenbroker, supra note 77.
100. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241 (1998) (citing Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154,
1160–61 (CA3 1986)). Though, the defendant may rebut the presumption.
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misstatements. This is because the impact of misstatements gets incorporated in
the stock price, the accuracy of which the purchasers and sellers directly relied.
Using this line of reasoning, the Supreme Court has determined that reliance is
presumed under a Rule 10b-5 action. 101
Finally, a plaintiff must plead loss causation. According to the PSLRA,
plaintiff shall have the burden of proving that “the act or omission of the
defendant alleged to violate [Section 10(b)] caused the loss for which the plaintiff
seeks to recover damages.” 102 Therefore, in the context of an allegedly fraudulent
misrepresentation, a plaintiff must plead that a company’s misrepresentation
proximately caused stock price movements according to which the plaintiff
incurred actual economic loss. 103 Together, the elements of materiality, reliance,
scienter, and loss causation form the basis of the most actively litigated anti-fraud
provision by private plaintiffs.
2. Rule 14a-9
Shareholders in the US have the right to vote on a basic set of issues at least
once a year at the annual shareholders meeting, including the right to vote for
directors on the corporation’s board. 104 The SEC governs communication
between the company and shareholders regarding the annual shareholders
meeting. 105 This includes regulation of the proxy statement under Section 14(a)
of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. 106 A proxy statement is a document
provided by a company’s board of directors to its shareholders ahead of an annual
or a special shareholder meeting for the purpose of helping shareholders make
informed decisions about matters arising during a shareholder meeting. 107
Distributing a proxy statement is effectively a requirement for public
companies, 108 and its contents are regulated specifically by the SEC via Schedule

101. Id. at 241, 248.
102. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4) (2021).
103. Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 344–47 (2005) (holding that plaintiff’s must
plead loss causation, i.e., that a defendant’s misrepresentations were the proximate cause of the
plaintiff’s loss).
104. See JACKIE COOK, MORNINGSTAR, THE PROXY PROCESS: RAISING THE INVESTOR VOICE TO
ADDRESS NEW RISK 2 (2019), https://www.morningstar.com/content/dam/marketing/shared/pdfs/Research
/The_Proxy_Process__Raising_the_Investor_Voice_to_Address_New_Risks.pdf; Ken Bertsch, The Value of
Shareholder Voting, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Apr. 23, 2020), https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2020/04/23
/the-value-of-shareholder-voting/ (“The number-one voting item in corporate elections is and always has been
election of directors.”)
105. COOK, supra note 104, at 3.
106. 15 U.S.C. § 78n (2021) (granting the SEC the authority to prescribe rules to govern the
solicitation of proxies).
107. Tuovila, supra note 12, at 5.
108. The SEC requires that shareholders of a company whose securities are registered under
Section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 receive a proxy statement prior to a shareholder
meeting, whether an annual or special meeting. 17 CFR § 240.14a-3.
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14A. 109 In addition, the SEC established Rule 14a-9 to enforce fraudulent
statements or omissions in proxy statements. 110 According to Rule 14a-9, “no
solicitation . . . shall be made by means of any proxy statement . . . containing
any statement which, at the time and in the light of the circumstances under which
it is made, is false or misleading with respect to any material fact . . . .” 111 Like
Rule 10b-5, the Supreme Court has determined that Rule 14a-9 includes an
implied private right of action, meaning private plaintiffs can sue companies that
make false or misleading statements in their proxy statements. 112 Aside from
this, the elements of a Rule 14a-9 claim are quite different from the elements of
Rule 10b-5.
Plaintiffs under Rule 14a-9 must plead only a material misstatement and loss
causation. 113 Notably, in relation to Rule 10b-5, reliance and scienter are left out
of Rule 14a-9. 114 In regards to the standard of materiality in Rule 14a-9, the
Supreme Court held in TSC Industries v. Northway Inc that a fact is material “if
there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it
important in deciding how to vote.” 115 Furthermore, the Supreme Court stated
that proving materiality does not require “proof of a substantial likelihood” that
109. 17 CFR § 240.14a-101 (2021).
110. 17 CFR § 240.14a-9 (2021). Compare to Rule 10b-5 which is applied to “all statements
made by issuers that provide information that is reasonably expected to reach investors in the trading
markets.” SEC Antifraud Provisions, supra note 11.
111. 17 CFR § 240.14a-9(a) (2021).
112. Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1086–87 (1991).
113. Plaintiffs must still plead in accordance with the requirements in FRCP Rule 8. In line
with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of FRCP, a plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim
that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007). Accordingly,
“threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,
do not suffice. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).
114. Rather than a scienter requirement, the federal courts are in general agreement that
negligence is the proper standard. Compare Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 472d 1281, 1299 (2d
Cir. 1973) and Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761, 777 (3d Cir. 1976) with Adams
v. Standard Knitting Mills, Inc., 623 F.2d 422, 429 (6th Cir. 1980) (holding that accountant are subject
to a scienter standard of liability under Rule 14a-9 for misstatements in the proxy statement). See also
Negligence vs. Scienter: The Proper Standard of Liability for Violations of the Antifraud Provisions
Regulating Tender Offers and Proxy Solicitations Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 41
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1045, 1051 – 56 (1984) (discussing the approach among Circuit Courts to the
standard of liability under Rule 14a-9). The Supreme Court has not determined the proper standard
of liability for Rule 14a-9, which left the lower courts to adopt lower standards. See Virginia
Bankshares, Inc., 501 U.S. at 1090 n.5 (reserving the question of whether scienter is necessary for
liability under § 14(a)). A wave of new suits under Rule 14a-9 could cause the Supreme Court to visit
this question. In regards to reliance, the Supreme Court held in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co. that
“[w]ere the misstatement or omission in a proxy statement has been shown to be “material,” . . . that
determination itself indubitably embodies a conclusion that the defect was of such a character that it
might have been considered important by a reasonable investor who was in the process of deciding
how to vote . . . .” 396 U.S. 375, 384 (1970). This view refuted the Court of Appeals, which
supplemented this requirement with a requirement of proof of whether the defect actually had a
decisive effect on the voting. See id. at 382 n.5; William H. Painter, Civil Liability Under the Federal
Proxy Rules, 64 WASH. U. L. Q. 425, 430–31 (1986).
115. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 439 (1976).
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accurate disclosure would have caused the “reasonable investor” to alter his vote;
rather, it requires showing a “substantial likelihood” that accurate disclosure
would have “assumed actual significance in the reasonable shareholder’s
deliberations.” 116 Therefore, like the standard in Rule 10b-5, the TSC Industries
Court established an objective standard of materiality focused on the “reasonable
investor.” In fact, it was the TSC Industries standard of materiality for Rule 14a9 that the Supreme Court expressly adopted for Rule 10b-5 in Basic, Inc. v.
Levinson. 117 Thus, it appears that the materiality standards under these separate
anti-fraud provisions are the exact same; but, as will be argued in Part II, this is
not actually the case, as there is a slight difference which has considerable
implications for diversity disclosures, in particular.
In regards to loss causation, plaintiffs have two options. First, they may prove
that solicitation of proxies was an “essential link” in accomplishing the
defendant’s objective for which the proxies were solicited. 118 For the sake of
illustration, consider the merger context, which is the most common situation
giving rise Rule 14a-9 liability. After the board of directors approves a merger,
proxy statements are distributed to shareholders to inform them of the terms and
purported benefits of the merger. If the proxy statement contains false or
misleading information, plaintiffs can sue under 14a-9 to enjoin the merger. In
Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, the question arose as to how such a
plaintiff can prove loss causation. In the case, the Supreme Court held that
causation is established where the proxy statement is an “essential link” in
completing the transaction for which defendants sought approval, which, in the
case of a merger, is the merger itself. 119 Crucially, a plaintiff need not show
directly that there were monetary losses as a result of the misstatement, as in Rule
10b-5; instead, a plaintiff need only show injury to his or her voting rights. 120 A
second option for plaintiffs to prove loss causation is to show loss of a state law
remedy, such as appraisal rights. 121 While the Supreme Court in Virginia
Bankshares did not decide the question of whether Rule 14a-9 provides a cause

116. Id.
117. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 224 (1988) (holding that “the standard set forth in
[TSC], whereby an omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that its disclosure would
have been considered significant by a reasonable investor, is expressly adopted for the § 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 context”).
118. Virginia Bankshares, Inc., 501 U.S. at 1121.
119. Id.
120. “Where there has been a finding of materiality, a shareholder has made a sufficient
showing of causal relationship between the violation and the injury for which he seeks redress if, as
here, he proves that the proxy solicitation itself, rather than the particular defect in the solicitation
materials, was an essential link in the accomplishment of the transaction.” Id. at 1111 (quoting Mills
v. Elec. Auto–Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 384–85 (1970)).
121. Appraisal rights are a statutory right under state corporate law to have a judicial proceeding
determine a fair stock price to be paid as merger consideration and oblige the acquiring corporation
to purchase shares at that price. James Chen, Appraisal Right, INVESTOPEDIA (Jun. 24, 2020),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/appraisalright.asp.
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of action for state remedies lost as a result of false or misleading proxy
solicitation, lower courts have generally held that it does. 122
By limiting the elements of Rule 14a-9 to causation and materiality and by
interpreting these elements in the aforementioned manner, the Supreme Court
sought to avoid the impracticalities of determining how many votes among
thousands of shareholders were affected by the alleged misstatements. 123
Furthermore, the Supreme Court recognized that making the elements of Rule
14a-9 more favorable to the plaintiff will effectuate the congressional policy of
ensuring that shareholders are able to make informed decisions regarding
fundamental matters of corporate governance. 124 As a result, the Supreme Court
established a weaker barrier, relative to Rule 10b-5, for private plaintiffs pursuing
fraud claims related to proxy statements.
II. COMPARING MATERIALITY STANDARDS IN RULES 10B-5 AND 14A-9
Materiality has traditionally been the biggest hurdle for plaintiffs making
securities fraud claims related to ESG statements, with courts considering such
statements mere declarations of corporate optimism on which no reasonable
investor would rely. 125 However, given the recent widespread efforts among
investors to increase and standardize ESG disclosures and the growing body of
evidence of the financial materiality of ESG factors, the materiality standard is
now less of an obstacle. 126 This is particularly true for securities fraud claims
against companies for allegedly false or misleading diversity plans.
If Nasdaq’s comply-or-explain board diversity proposal were to be approved,
or if the SEC were to make similar disclosure requirements in the future, proxy
statements would likely contain more detailed information regarding board
diversity goals and objectives, exposing companies to a potential source of
securities fraud liability. In these circumstances, Rule 10b-5, as the catch-all
provision for securities fraud, and Rule 14a-9, which deals specifically with
fraudulent statements in proxy statements, would be potentially applicable. And,
given the fact that the Supreme Court expressly adopted the materiality standard
of Rule 14a-9 for Rule 10b-5 as well, the materiality test under each of these rules
should be theoretically identical and lead to the same outcome. This may have
122. CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 88, at 831; see, e.g., Wilson v. Great Am. Indus., 979 F.2d
924, 930 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that plaintiff established causation under Rule 14a-9 based upon
plaintiff’s loss of its state law appraisal remedy).
123. Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 385 (1970).
124. Id.
125. See Hoffman supra note 14.
126. See Saad & Strauss, supra note 29, at 418 (stating, in the context of ESG, “If, as the
securities doctrine maintains, material information is that which is important to a reasonable investor,
then the observed trends, which depart from shareholder demographics and behavior of the past
decades, suggest a corresponding need to change the scope of disclosures considered legally
material.”). See also United States v. Litvak, 889 F.3d 56, 64-65 (2d Cir. 2018) (“[T]he standard of a
‘reasonable investor,’ like the negligence standard of a ‘reasonable man,’ is an objective one. The
standard may vary, therefore, with the nature of the traders involved in the particular market.”).
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been true at one time, but the rise of passive management has called this
assumption into question. For Rule 10b-5, an allegedly false or misleading
statement is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor
would consider it important to his or her trading decision (i.e., to purchase or
sell). 127 But, for Rule 14a-9, an allegedly false or misleading statement is
material if there is substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would
consider it important in deciding how to vote. 128 While these standards may be
sufficiently analogous in enough situations to consider them the same standard,
the difference in decision type (trading decision versus voting decision) has
considerable implications for a securities fraud claim related to diversity plans in
proxy statements. The following section evaluates the materiality of board
diversity, first under Rule 10b-5 and then under Rule 14a-9.
A. The Reasonable Investor
Despite slight yet meaningful differences with respect to the materiality
element, Rules 10b-5 and 14a-9 both agree that materiality is evaluated with
respect to the “reasonable investor.” Therefore, it is necessary to first consider
what a “reasonable investor” is. However, the meaning of “reasonable investor”
is not entirely clear; regulators, scholars, and courts have not universally agreed
upon a definition. 129 Nevertheless, there seems to be a general consensus that the
“reasonable investor” is an idealized, economically rational retail investor that
invests for the long term. 130 But, given the rise of passive investing and the
drastic increase in institutional ownership, it may be time to reassess this
definition.

127. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 224, 235 (1988). Rule 10b-5, though considered a
catch-all provision, is restricted to fraud “in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.” 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-5 (2020). Furthermore, it only applies to shareholders that purchased or sold a company’s securities
during the class period, i.e., dates during which the fraud purportedly occurred. See generally Elizabeth L.
Yingling, U.S. Securities Class Actions – An Overview, Baker McKenzie, https://www.bakermckenzie.com//media/files/locations/india/overview_of_a_securities_class_action_suit.pdf?la=en.
128. TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 439 (1976).
129. See Amanda M. Rose, The Reasonable Investor of Federal Securities Law: Insights from
Tort Law’s Reasonable Person & Suggested Reforms, 43 J. CORP. L. 77, 78-79 (2017) (describing the
debate surrounding “reasonable investor” and noting Supreme Court precedent that materiality
determinations via the reasonable investor test are highly fact-intensive); Stephen J. Choi & A.C.
Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1, 70 (2003) (describing the
difficulties of defining “reasonable investor” since many investors suffer from behavioral biases and
are easily led astray by overoptimism); Stefan J. Padfield, Is Puffery Material to Investors? Maybe
We Should Ask Them, 10 U. PA. J. BUS. & EMP. L. 339, 340–41 (2008) (explaining survey results in
which judges concluded no reasonable investor could find particular statements material while
between 33% and 84% of the investors studied considered the statements material).
130. See Tom C.W. Lin, Reasonable Investor(s), 95 B.U. L. REV. 461, 466–68 (2015); Saad &
Strauss, supra note 29, at 400 (describing the “reasonable investor” as an “economically rational actor
who relies solely on financial disclosures in making decisions about the purchase and sale of
securities”).
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Investors in the U.S. stock market can generally be separated into two
categories: retail investors, which includes everyday, individual, nonprofessional investors; and institutional investors, which include professional
investors such as mutual funds, pensions, and insurance companies. 131 Currently,
institutional investors own about 75 to 80% of the market value of publicly traded
companies in the United States. 132 Compare this to 1950, when retail investors
owned over 90% of the stock of U.S. corporations. 133 As a result of this trend,
approximately three-quarters of the shares in U.S. public companies are not
owned directly by the constituency that apparently represents the “reasonable
investor” in the market for public company stock.
Coinciding with this trend of increased institutional investor ownership has
been a dramatic shift toward passive investing. Passive investing can be
contrasted with active investing, which is a “hands-on” approach of picking
individual stocks in order to beat the stock market’s average returns. 134 If a retail
investor wants to engage in an active strategy, they either pick individual stocks
on their own or hire a portfolio manager to do it for them. Passive investing, on
the other hand, generally involves investing in an index, which is essentially a
portfolio of potentially thousands of stocks that mirrors performance of the
market as a whole and, thus, is subject to less risk than an active portfolio. 135 The
only buying and selling that takes place from a passive investor’s perspective is
the buying and selling of “shares” in the index fund. From the perspective of the
asset manager that is administering the index fund, buying and selling takes place
to satisfy redemptions, invest new dollars, and ensure that the underlying fund
reflects the relative weights of the companies in the index. Therefore, unlike
active investing, there is no evaluation of whether the companies in the index are
good investments because the fund simply tracks the index; however, asset
managers trade an enormous volume of shares in order to keep the index in
balance. 136
The practicality of investing in the market portfolio, the relatively lower
costs, and the evidence of underperformance of active managers have led to a
massive growth of passive funds serving retail investors. 137 In fact, passive and
active funds in the U.S. reached parity in April 2019, each totaling about $4.3

131. See generally James Chen, Institutional Investor, INVESTOPEDIA (Mar. 20, 2020),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/i/institutionalinvestor.asp.
132. See 80% of Equity Market Cap Held by Institutions, supra note 21.
133. Alicia J. Davis, A Requiem for the Retail Investor?, 95 VA. L. REV. 1105, 1105 (2009).
134. The Investopedia Team, Active vs. Passive Investing: What’s the Difference?,
INVESTOPEDIA (Sept. 5, 2020), https://www.investopedia.com/news/active-vs-passive-investing.
135. Id.
136. See, e.g., Chris Flood, Popularity of Passive Investing Changes Rules of the Game, FIN.
TIMES (Oct. 21, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/3cc857e0-d0c0-11e9-b018-ca4456540ea6.
137. Kenechukwu Anadu, Mathias Kruttli, Patrick McCabe & Emilio Osambela, The Shift from
Active to Passive Investing: Risks to Financial Stability? 4 (Fed. Rsrv Bank of Bos, Working Paper
No. 2018-060, 2020).
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trillion in assets. 138 Compare this to the end of 1998, when there were 6.5 times
as many assets in actively managed U.S. stock funds as there were in index
funds. 139 The main beneficiaries of this trend have been the Big Three asset
managers: BlackRock, State Street, and Vanguard. 140 These three now own an
average of 20.5% of outstanding shares of S&P 500 companies, and, together,
they are the largest shareholder in 88% of those companies. 141 Furthermore, the
growth in assets under management has given these asset managers considerable
influence on the proxy voting process. 142 This is because investors in index funds
do not own the underlying shares of the companies that are in the index; rather,
the mutual fund owns the shares from which the investors in the index receive
cash flows. Asset managers exercise voting rights on the fund’s behalf. 143
These significant changes in the ownership of public company stock require
a reconsideration of the “reasonable investor” test. Asset managers vote the
overwhelming majority of shares in the stock market and account for the most
trading volume. Consequently, it is asset managers, and, in particular, the Big
Three, who determine whether most proxy proposals succeed or fail. 144
Reflecting the objective nature of the “reasonable investor” test, the Second
Circuit held that the “reasonable investor” may vary “with the nature of the
traders involved in the particular market;” 145 therefore, the “reasonable investor”
test in the market for public company stock should at least consider the
perspective and actions of institutional investors. In light of the drastic changes
in public stock ownership, to do otherwise (i.e., to treat today’s “reasonable
investor” as only an unsophisticated retail investor) would make the test glaringly
incomplete. The following analysis of materiality under Rules 10b-5 and 14a-9
operates under the assumption that institutional investor behavior is relevant to
an assessment of the “reasonable investor.”

138. Tom Lauricella & Gabrielle DiBenedetto, A Look at the Road to Asset Parity Between
Passive and Active U.S. Funds, MORNINGSTAR: BIG PICTURE (June 12, 2019), https://
www.morningstar.com/insights/2019/06/12/asset-parity.
139. Id.
140. Caleb N. Griffin, Margins: Estimating the Influence of the Big Three on Shareholder
Proposals, 73 SMU L. REV. 409, 414 (2020) (finding that the Big Three together hold 81% of index
fund assets, while other index fund providers struggle to compete).
141. Id. at 417, 419.
142. See id. at 442–43.
143. See, e.g., BARBARA NOVICK ET AL., THE INVESTMENT STEWARDSHIP ECOSYSTEM 13
(BlackRock July 2018), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/whitepaper/viewpointinvestment-stewardship-ecosystem-july-2018.pdf (estimating that only 8% of BlackRock’s equity
holdings are outsourced for voting purposes).
144. See Griffin, supra note 140, at 442–43.
145. United States v. Litvak, 889 F.3d 56, 64-65 (2d Cir. 2018); Saad & Strauss, supra note 29,
at 418 (stating, in the context of ESG, “If, as the securities doctrine maintains, material information
is that which is important to a reasonable investor, then the observed trends, which depart from
shareholder demographics and behavior of the past decades, suggest a corresponding need to change
the scope of disclosures considered legally material”).
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B. Materiality of Diversity Disclosures under Rule 10b-5
Under Rule 10b-5, a statement is material if there is a substantial likelihood
that a “reasonable investor” would consider the statement important to their
decision to buy or sell the company’s securities. 146 Therefore, a plaintiff alleging
that a company made false or misleading statements in regards to its diversity
plans and objectives must show that there is a substantial likelihood that a
“reasonable investor” would have considered the diversity disclosures important
to their decision to buy or sell the company’s securities. Despite the increased
attention on diversity in the boardroom, however, there is less support for the
proposition that investors consider diversity important to a decision to buy or sell
a company’s stock.
1. Evidence of Rule 10b-5 Materiality from Institutional Investors
The most often-cited evidence of ESG’s materiality are the attitudes of major
asset managers, especially BlackRock. 147 BlackRock, as the largest asset
manager in the world with $8.7 trillion in AUM, carries considerable weight and
influence. 148 When BlackRock makes a commitment to “making sustainability
our new standard of investing,” 149 it understandably makes headlines. However,
less attention is paid to the effect of these commitments on how BlackRock buys
and sells securities in its portfolios.
For example, BlackRock touts that it has achieved its goal of “having 100%
of its active and advisory portfolios ESG-integrated.” 150 BlackRock defines ESG
integration as “the practice of incorporating material ESG information into
investment decisions with the objective of improving the long-term financial
outcomes of our clients’ portfolios, consistent with our clients’ objectives.” 151
However, in its annually reviewed ESG Integration Statement that applies to all
of BlackRock’s investment divisions and investment teams, BlackRock provides
no additional explanation as to what “material ESG information” may include. 152
BlackRock’s client letter reveals that this definition includes some minimal level
146. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2020) (stating that the rule applies to fraud “in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.”); Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 224 (1988).
147. See, e.g., Saad & Strauss, supra note 29, at 413–14 (citing statements by BlackRock
Chairman and CEO Larry Fink as evidence that “investors are keen to incorporate ESG data to achieve
accurate pricing” and that “ESG data is acquiring financial materiality for firms with a more
traditional, rather than SRI directed, orientation”); Eccles & Klimenko, supra note 40 (citing
BlackRock’s integration of ESG into financial analysis as evidence of ESG’s materiality).
148. Christine Williamson, BlackRock Sets Record with $8.7 Trillion in AUM, PENSIONS &
INVS. (Jan. 14, 2021, 3:04 PM), https://www.pionline.com/money-management/blackrock-setsrecord-87-trillion-aum.
149. Net Zero: A Fiduciary Approach, BLACKROCK (2021), https://www.blackrock.com
/corporate/investor-relations/blackrock-client-letter.
150. Id.
151. BLACKROCK, BLACKROCK ESG INTEGRATION STATEMENT 2 (2020), https://
www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/publication/blk-esg-investment-statement-web.pdf.
152. Id.

182

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

[Vol. 11:1

of environmental screening, as it has pledged to remove companies generating
more than 25% of revenues from thermal coal production from its discretionary
active investment portfolios. 153 But, outside of this environmental screening
process, it is unclear how BlackRock is addressing the multitude of other factors
that ESG entails, especially in regards to what companies’ shares it buys and sells.
In particular, there does not appear to be a screening process related to
diversity. 154 In fact, when BlackRock discusses diversity, it uses soft language
like “diversity may be material and could affect long-term performance” and that
diversity “is playing an increasingly important role . . . in our investment
solutions.” 155 Despite this vague language, BlackRock has made commitments
to addressing diversity in its proxy voting guidelines, which state that BlackRock
may vote against members of a board of directors’ nominating committee for not
adequately accounting for diversity in their board composition. 156 BlackRock’s
proxy voting guidelines also encourage boards to disclose more diversity
metrics. 157 It is crucial to note, however, that these efforts are not related to
buying and selling company securities, which is the focus of the materiality
inquiry under Rule 10b-5. Rather, they are related to engagement efforts,
specifically via proxy voting, which is separate from buying and selling
decisions.
Furthermore, because the assets of asset managers who are pushing ESG
integration are heavily concentrated in passive funds, 158 these managers are only
able to make ESG-related investment decisions with respect to a small subset of
their AUM. BlackRock has already run into this issue; despite its commitment

153. Sustainability as BlackRock’s New Standard for Investing, BLACKROCK,
https://www.blackrock.com/au/individual/blackrock-client-letter (last visited Nov. 7, 2021).
154. See, e.g., Larry Fink, Larry Fink’s 2021 Letter to CEOs, BLACKROCK,
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/larry-fink-ceo-letter. Larry Fink’s 2021
letter to portfolio companies focused heavily on BlackRock’s commitments to environmental
sustainability. Id. Diversity received little attention; when it was discussed, Fink only asked that
“disclosures on talent strategy fully reflect . . . long-term plans to improve diversity, equity, and
inclusion, as appropriate by region,” which will help BlackRock “better understand the deep
interdependence between environmental and social issues.” Id. Compare this to the relatively explicit
standards imposed on sustainability, such as the “heightened-scrutiny model in . . . active portfolios”
for companies “that pose significant climate risk (including flagging holdings for potential exit)”. Id.
155. Amelia Tan, Inclusion and Diversity, BLACKROCK, https://www.blackrock.com/uk
/individual/insights/blog/investing-in-inclusion-diversity (last visited Nov. 7, 2021).
156. BLACKROCK, BLACKROCK INVESTMENT STEWARDSHIP: PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES
FOR U.S. SECURITIES, supra note 58, at 6 (“To the extent that a company has not adequately accounted
for diversity in its board composition within a reasonable timeframe, based on our assessment, we
may vote against members of the nominating/governance committee for an apparent lack of
commitment to board effectiveness.”).
157. Id.
158. Fichtner et al., supra note 20, at 304 (“The share of AuM in passive funds is well over 80
percent for BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street. . . .”). Index fund managers together account for
over $11 trillion in AUM. Gregor Stuart Hunter, Index-Fund Trillions are Distorting Prices in the
S&P 500, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 13, 2021, 2:13 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/202101-13/trillions-of-dollars-in-index-funds-are-distorting-the-s-p-500.
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to sustainability, it holds over $85 billion in coal company stock. 159 One
explanation for this is that some coal-related companies do not meet BlackRock’s
25% threshold for divestiture, but the bigger issue is that 90% of BlackRock’s
assets are in passive funds, 160 the contents of which BlackRock is unable to alter
because these funds track an index which BlackRock does not control (though, it
does choose which indices to track). Therefore, regardless of any commitment
to ESG integration, BlackRock has to hold some coal company stock and some
of every other company’s stock with which it may disagree on ESG-related
matters. The hands of other managers of passive funds are similarly tied; 161 and,
given the dramatic rise in assets under passive management, this trend is likely to
continue and become even more pronounced.
As a result of these limitations, BlackRock has been accused of
“greenwashing,” the process of falsely making a business seem more
environmentally friendly than it really is. 162 And BlackRock, which literally
can’t put its money where its mouth is with respect to 90% of its assets, is a
worthy candidate of such criticism, as are other major index fund providers. 163
Greenwashing is similar to “cheap talk,” a concept in game theory that refers to
communication between players that does not directly affect the payoffs of the
game, meaning that it does not affect outcomes. 164 More specifically, cheap talk
is communication in the market that is (1) costless to transmit and receive, (2)
non-binding, and (3) unverifiable. 165 In this context, a fund saying that ESG is
important is costless, non-binding, and generally unverifiable communication.
The motivation for saying this is clear – funds want to attract capital. Kim &
Yoon provide support for this proposition. They find that active fund managers
who sign on to the United Nation’s Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI),
159. Oscar Williams-Grut, BlackRock Accused of ‘Greenwashing’ $85bn Coal Investments,
YAHOO! FIN. (Jan. 13, 2021), https://uk.finance.yahoo.com/news/blackrock-larry-fink-climate-lettergreenwashing-reclaim-finance-urgewald-070023916.html.
160. See Liam Kennedy, BlackRock: Active Transformation, IPE (Jan. 2018), https://
www.ipe.com/blackrock-active-transformation/10022518.article (finding that “BlackRock’s $300bn
in active equity may represent less than 10% of its overall equity AUM”).
161. See Debbie Carlson, BlackRock’s Push on ESG is Coming at ‘A Business-Friendly Pace’,
MARKETWATCH (Feb. 6, 2021, 12:21 PM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/blackrocks-push-onesg-and-climate-goals-is-coming-at-a-business-friendly-pace-11612226740. (“According to Fossil Free
Funds, 6.38% of 312 BlackRock/iShares equity funds hold fossil-fuel companies, representing $104
billion. Vanguard has 6.1%, or $262 billion of fossil-fuel companies in 100 equity funds, and Fidelity has
$84 billion, or 5%, invested in fossil-fuel stocks across 297 equity funds.”).
162. See, e.g., Richard Henderson, BlackRock Joins Climate Action Group after ‘Greenwash’
Criticism, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 9, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/16125442-32b4-11ea-a3290bcf87a328f2 (citing criticism of BlackRock by former US vice-president Al Gore and Christopher
Hohn of sustainable hedge fund TCI for being “full of greenwash”); Williams-Grut, supra note 159.
163. A study by Allianz Global Management finds that only 1% of portfolios worldwide are
managed in an ESG-conscious way, suggesting that, while the narrative surrounding ESG may have
shifted among institutional investors, actual integration of ESG has lagged. See ALLIANZ GLOB. INVS.,
SUSTAINABLE INVESTING REPORT 2019, supra note 46, at 22.
164. See Crawford & Sobel, supra note 18.
165. See Joseph Farrell, Cheap Talk, Coordination, and Entry, 18 RAND J. ECON. 34, 34 (1987).
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a (non-binding) initiative in which fund managers commit to incorporating ESG
into their portfolio decision-making, 166 experience large fund inflows, regardless
of the funds’ prior ESG performance. 167 However, after signing on, PRI funds do
not show improvements in fund-level ESG scores and even experience a decrease
in portfolio return, providing considerable support for the cheap talk hypothesis
in the context of ESG. 168
Despite its roots in environmental sustainability, greenwashing and the
similar concept of cheap talk can be extended to diversity as well. Major asset
managers have been very outspoken in their support for diversity and
inclusion; 169 however, they do not appear to be as enthusiastic about
implementation. First, BlackRock and other major asset managers have not made
any firm commitment to orient their active portfolios according to diversity
factors, and they are restricted from doing so with respect to their passive funds.
Second, initiatives at BlackRock and other major asset managers that pertain
specifically to diversity do not appear to extend past board engagement into the
actual buying and selling of a company’s stock. Therefore, despite what these
asset managers may say, citing institutional investor efforts on ESG as proof of
materiality under Rule 10b-5 is not a compelling argument. In fact, their talk is
cheap.
But what about the literature supporting the financial materiality of a diverse
board? 170 First, while the majority of studies support the conclusion that diversity
in the boardroom increases financial performance, the literature is not
166. What Are the Principles for Responsible Investment?, PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE INV.,
https://www.unpri.org/pri/what-are-the-principles-for-responsible-investment (last visited Nov. 7,
2021). Institutional investor signatories to the Principles for Responsible Investment commit to six
principles: (1) to incorporate ESG issues into investment analysis and decision-making processes, (2)
to be active owners and incorporate ESG issues into their ownership policies and practices, (3) to seek
appropriate disclosure on ESG issues by the entities in which they invest, (4) to promote acceptance
and implementation of the Principles within the investment industry, (5) to work together to enhance
their effectiveness in implementing the Principles, and (6) to each report on their activities and
progress towards implementing the Principles. Id. However, the Principles are described as “voluntary
and aspirational” and are not legally binding. Id.
167. See Soohun Kim & Aaron S. Yoon, Analyzing Active Managers’ Commitment to ESG:
Evidence from United Nations Principles for Responsible Investment 13–14 (Mar. 17, 2020)
(unpublished manuscript).
168. Id. at 14–15, 17; see also Gibson et al., Responsible Investing Around the World 4–6 (Euro.
Corp. Governance Inst., Fin. Working Paper No. 712/2020) (2020) (finding that US-based PRI
signatory institutions that partially implement ESG strategies exhibit worse portfolio-level ESG
scores than non-PRI institutions). It is important to note that inflows increased into funds that signed
the PRI, suggesting that institutional investors may value ESG generally. Id. But, again, this
proposition is related to ESG generally and not a specific ESG factor, like diversity. It also does not
apply to the actual buying and selling in the securities of public companies, which the Gibson et al.
study concludes is not affected by signing onto the PRI. Id.
169. See CFA INST., DRIVING CHANGE: DIVERSITY & INCLUSION IN INVESTMENT
MANAGEMENT 5 (2018), https://www.cfainstitute.org/-/media/documents/survey/diversity-andinclusion-report-full.ashx (finding that 83% of more than 800 institutional investors surveyed said
gender diversity is important to them).
170. See supra text accompanying note 68.
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conclusive. 171 Second, and more importantly, these studies are not asking the
right question; they ask whether companies with a diverse board experience better
returns than those without a diverse board. But this is a different question than
what is necessary under the materiality test in Rule 10b-5, which asks whether
there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would consider the
diversity of a company’s board as an important factor in deciding whether to
purchase or sell the company’s shares. To provide support in this context, a study
would need to show that the diversity of a prospective portfolio company’s board
affects whether funds include the company in their portfolios (i.e. that board
diversity matters to how institutional investors purchase and sell securities);
however, to date, there has been no such evidence. 172 Therefore, though
favorable to the materiality of board diversity in a general financial sense, the
literature and the efforts by institutional investors do not clearly support the more
specific notion of materiality under Rule 10b-5.
2. Evidence of Rule 10b-5 Materiality from Retail Investors
Generalized claims about what investors want in regard to ESG are nearly
always made in relation to institutional investors, reflecting a top-down approach
to ESG in the investment community. 173 However, this ignores what retail
investors think about the issue, which is crucial to materiality under Rule 10b-5
and its analysis of the reasonable investor. While there have been a significant
number of studies and surveys about what professional managers think and how
they behave in relation to ESG, there has been comparably little examination of
retail investors in this context. And, where there is evidence, it lacks support for
the materiality of board diversity under Rule 10b-5.
Vontobel Asset Management conducted possibly the most comprehensive
survey of retail investors globally concerning ESG, and its findings are instructive
here. Most notably, the study finds that 76% of retail investors in the US know
nothing about ESG investment. 174 Furthermore, of retail investors globally who
171. Id.
172. Related studies find support for greater net inflows by into funds with high sustainability
ratings; but this is applied to ESG as a whole, so its explanatory power in the context of board diversity
is not as strong. See, e.g., Samuel M. Hartzmark & Abigail B. Sussman, Do Investors Value
Sustainability? A Natural Experiment Examining Ranking and Fund Flows (Euro. Corp. Governance
Inst. Finance Working Paper No. 565/2018, 2019) (finding that funds with high sustainability ratings
receive greater positive fund flows than those with low sustainability ratings). Other studies on
institutional investors concern ESG ratings of the funds themselves and how this affects fund
performance; however, this suffers from the same problem–it does not address the question of whether
board diversity is an important factor in determining whether to include a company in the fund. See,
e.g., Rajna Gibson, Philipp Krueger & Shema F. Mitali, The Sustainability Footprint of Institutional
Investors: ESG Driven Price Pressure and Performance (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Finance
Working Paper No. 571/2018, 2021) (finding that institutional investors with better sustainability
footprints outperform).
173. See, e.g., Eccles & Klimenko, supra note 40, (citing interviews with professional asset
managers and high net worth individuals).
174. BANK VONTOBEL AG, DRIVE POSITIVE CHANGE WITH ESG 9 (2019).
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had heard of ESG, 46% expressed concerns that they do not have sufficient
savings and investments “to indulge in the luxury of an ESG approach,” and 23%
expressed concerns that an ESG approach would compromise performance
(increasing to 43% among those with over $100,000 to invest). 175 Despite these
findings, a retail investor survey by Allianz shows that 75% of respondents are
interested in sustainable investments; however, this does not support to the
specific proposition that retail investors consider board diversity an important
factor when deciding whether to purchase or sell a company’s securities. 176
Surveys are not a reliable indicator of materiality, especially in the context of
ESG. The literature has long understood that research participants tend to bias
their responses in surveys in order to appear in a more favorable light. 177 Not
surprisingly, this has been observed in the ESG context as well. 178 Furthermore,
even if these surveys were taken into account, they suggest that retail investors
are largely in the dark when it comes to ESG investing. And, among the retail
investors that are apparently aware and interested, there is little evidence to
suggest that these investors incorporate diversity, an ESG factor long considered
difficult to integrate, into their investment decisions.
Nevertheless, the literature provides some support for the notion that retail
investors care about ESG. For example, Martin & Moser find that potential retail
investors in an experimental market setting respond more positively to voluntary
disclosure of green investment than to no report.179 Likewise, in an experimental
market setting, Cheng, Green & Ko find that investors perceive ESG indicators
to be more important than indicators unrelated to ESG and that investors are more
willing to invest in a company whose ESG indicators have high strategic
relevance. 180 However, these are laboratory tests; therefore, their explanatory
value in the actual securities markets is limited. 181 More specifically, retail
investors’ allocation in a hypothetical portfolio of hypothetical money is not
strong evidence of materiality under Rule 10b-5—if institutional investors need
to put their money where their mouth is in regards to their support for ESG and
175. Id. at 19.
176. ALLIANZ GLOB. INVS., SUSTAINABLE INVESTING REPORT 2019, supra note 46, at 22.
177. See Douglas P. Crowne & David Marlowe, A New Scale of Social Desirability
Independent of Psychopathy, 24 J. OF CONSULTING PSYCH. 349 (1960); see also Stepan Vesely &
Christian A. Klöckner, Social Desirability in Environmental Psychology Research: Three MetaAnalyses, 11 FRONTIERS PSYCH. 1395 (2020).
178. See, e.g., Christine Kormos & Robert Gifford, The Validity of Self-report Measures of
Proenvironmental Behavior: A Meta-analytic Review, 40 J. OF ENVIRONMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 359,
369 (2014) (finding that self-report validity can vary widely across surveys of proenvironmental
behavior).
179. Patrick M. Martin & Donald V. Moser, Managers’ Green Investment Disclosures and
Investors’ Reaction, 61 J. ACCT. & ECON. 239, 252–53 (2016).
180. Mandy M. Cheng, Wendy J. Green & John C. Ko, The Impact of Strategic Relevance and
Assurance of Sustainability Indicators on Investors’ Decisions, 34 AUDITING: J. OF PRAC. & THEORY
131, 131 (2014).
181. Response bias is observed in experiments, as well. See Crowne & Marlowe supra note
177; Vesely & Klöckner, supra note 177; Kormos & Gifford, supra note 178.
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diversity before the Rule 10b-5 materiality analysis changes, the same should be
expected from retail investors.
In fact, the literature also provides support for the proposition that retail
investors do not care about ESG. For example, Moss et al. examine the link
between company-level ESG factors and retail investors’ buying and selling
behaviors, not in a laboratory, but in the actual markets. 182 In a first-of-its-kind
study, Moss et al. use data from Robinhood Markets Inc. to provide direct
evidence on retail investor portfolio decisions. 183 Focusing on press releases
rather than surveys or studies of ESG performance, they conduct an event study
that compares outcome variables across event and non-event days (i.e. days with
an ESG-related press release and days without an ESG-related press release) and
find that the retail investor response to ESG-related press releases is
indistinguishable from days without ESG-related press releases. 184 As a result,
they conclude that ESG disclosure is irrelevant to retail investors’ portfolio
reallocation decisions. 185
These research findings, in coordination with retail investor surveys
regarding ESG, describe a retail investor community that does not make
investment decisions according to ESG factors. Instead, it appears as though
most retail investors do not even know about ESG; and, of the ones that do, ESG
is not an important factor in their decision to buy or sell a company’s securities. 186
Yet, many retail investors say they are interested in ESG; 187 suggesting that the
greenwashing/cheap talk hypothesis may aptly apply to individual investors as
well. 188 Furthermore, while these studies and surveys of retail investors focus on
ESG generally, such a conclusion may also be consistent with retail investor

182. Austin Moss, James P. Naughton & Clare Wang, The Irrelevance of ESG Disclosure to
Retail Investors 1–2 (working paper, 2020).
183. Id. Robinhood is a discount brokerage that offers commission-free trading through its
website and mobile app. The service has more than 13 million users, and is seen as a proxy for retail
trading activity. Matthew Johnston, How Robinhood Makes Money, INVESTOPEDIA (Mar. 14, 2021),
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/active-trading/020515/how-robinhood-makes-money.asp; see
generally Maggie Fitzgerald, Retail Investors Continue to Jump into the Stock Market after GameStop
Mania, CNBC (Mar. 10, 2021), https://www.cnbc.com/2021/03/10/retail-investor-ranks-in-thestock-market-continue-to-surge.html (describing Robinhood’s popularity and the increasing presence
of retail investment).
184. See Moss, Naughton & Wang, supra note 182, at 20–21.
185. Id.
186. See BANK VONTOBEL AG supra note 175 and accompanying text. Therefore, to suggest that
ESG is a mainstream investment strategy would be factually inaccurate. See, e.g., The Readback,
Sustainable Investing Hits a Tipping Point, Barron’s, at 0:25 (Jan. 22, 2020, 5:26:37 PM),
https://www.barrons.com/podcasts/the-readback/65-sustainable-investing-hits-a-tipping-point/88551690206a-45e9-9132-a702d40ce31b?page=1 (stating that ESG is “blazing a new path into the mainstream”).
187. See ALLIANZ GLOB. INVS., SUSTAINABLE INVESTING REPORT 2019, supra note 46, at 22.
188. See supra notes 164–65 and accompanying text; see also Lorianne Mitchell & Wesley
Ramey, Look How Green I Am! An Individual-level Explanation for Greenwashing, 12 J. OF APPLIED
BUS. & ECON. 40, 42–43 (explaining that motivations for greenwashing extend apply not only to
companies but also to individuals, who selfishly contend to be perceived as altruistic because it
elevates one’s status).
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attitudes towards board diversity. Consequently, the current behavior of retail
investors provides little support for the materiality of board diversity under Rule
10b-5.
In summary, despite claims from investors that ESG is “important” and that
they plan to take action to increase board diversity, 189 the buying and selling
habits of institutional and retail investors suggest that board diversity is not an
important factor when determining whether to invest in a company. Rather, in
the context of actual buying and selling decisions, statements from investors
regarding board diversity are mostly cheap talk—costless, nonbinding, and
unverifiable. 190 As a result of these characteristics, plaintiffs in a securities fraud
suit alleging false or misleading statements related to board diversity would likely
face challenges in pleading materiality under Rule 10b-5.
C. Materiality of Diversity Disclosures under Rule 14a-9
Under Rule 14a-9, which applies to proxy statements specifically, a statement
is material if correct disclosure of the statement would have assumed actual
significance in a reasonable shareholder’s deliberations regarding how to vote at
a special or annual shareholders meeting. 191 There are many different issues that
are voted upon at a shareholders meeting; therefore, it is important to identify the
particular voting decision to which a misstatement under Rule 14a-9 is relevant.
In relation to allegedly false or misleading statements regarding board diversity,
the relevant voting decision would be the election of directors and/or members of
the nominating committee. Consequently, the argument in favor of Rule 14a-9
materiality in this context would be that correct disclosure about a company’s
board diversity would have assumed actual significance in a reasonable
shareholder’s deliberations with respect to director elections. While the
materiality argument under Rule 10b-5 fell flat because of its focus on buying
and selling decisions, there is a growing body of evidence that board diversity is
an important factor in how investors cast votes for directors, making a strong case
for materiality under Rule 14a-9.
1. Evidence of Rule 14a-9 Materiality from Institutional Investors
Institutional investors have massive influence over shareholder voting.
Institutional ownership in publicly traded companies in the US is around 80%.
While institutional ownership as a category comprises a vast, heterogeneous
group of funds, concentration of ownership among the largest institutional
shareholders is nevertheless striking. For example, among the twenty biggest US
corporations, the largest five institutional shareholders control a median of

189.
190.
191.
(2021).

See supra Section I.B.
See Crawford & Sobel, supra note 18; see Farrell, supra note 165.
TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 439 (1976); see 17 CFR § 240.14a-9(a)

FALL 2021]

Board Diversity Shareholder Suits

189

approximately 20% of outstanding stock. 192 The largest twenty institutional
shareholders control a median of approximately 33% of stock; and the largest
fifty control a median of approximately 44% of stock. 193 And these numbers are
expected to steadily grow.
Fund managers generally have the right and, typically, the obligation to vote
the shares they own on behalf of fund investors. While clients with equity
separate accounts (i.e., an investment portfolio owned by an individual investor
and managed by a professional asset manager, as opposed to an index fund which
has many individual investors) may choose not to delegate voting responsibility
to the asset manager, this rarely occurs. 194 For example, BlackRock estimates
that, across its equity holdings, only about 8% of AUM are outsourced to an
independent fiduciary to vote–BlackRock votes the rest. 195 If voting is delegated
to the asset manager, regulations and stewardship codes often require asset
managers to vote proxies on companies in which they invest on behalf of clients
to the extent their clients have delegated voting authority to the asset manager. 196
For instance, both the SEC and the Department of Labor have issued guidance
stating that, as fiduciaries, asset managers must vote proxies when doing so is in
the best interest of their clients. 197 This results in high turnout rates among
professionally managed shares. According to the Government Accountability
Office’s assessment of the 2016 proxy season, 91% of institutional investors
voted their shares, compared to 28% of retail investors. This means that
approximately 90% of votes cast in the average shareholder election are cast by
institutional investors, translating to substantial power at annual shareholders
meetings. 198
So, what is important to the voting decisions such a significant block of the
corporate electorate? Not surprisingly, ESG appears to be at the top of the list. 199
192. Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Scott Hirst, The Agency Problems of Institutional
Investors, J. OF ECON. PERSPS., Summer 2017, at 89, 92 tbl. 1.
193. Id.
194. See generally James Chen, Separate Account, INVESTOPEDIA (Nov. 4, 2020),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/separateaccount.asp.
195. NOVICK, ET AL., supra note 143.
196. Id.
197. Id.; see Commission Guidance Regarding Proxy Voting Responsibilities of Investment
Advisers, Release No. IA5325, 84 FR 47420 (Sept. 10, 2019); Fiduciary Duties Regarding Proxy
Voting and Shareholder Rights, 85 Fed. Reg. 81658 (Dec. 16, 2020) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt.
2509, 2550); see also Konstantinos Zachariadis, Dragana Cvijanovic & Moqi Groen-Xu, Free-Riders
and Underdogs: Participation in Corporate Voting 9–10 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Finance
Working Paper No. 649/2020, 2020) (finding that investment funds with a fiduciary duty to vote on
behalf of their clients hold an average approximately 25% of the shares in US publicly listed
companies).
198. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-17-47, CORPORATE SHAREHOLDER MEETINGS:
PROXY ADVISORY FIRMS’ ROLE IN VOTING AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRACTICES 13 (2016).
199. See, e.g., Morrow Sodali, Institutional Investors Highlight the Growing Importance of
ESG in Investment and Proxy Voting Decisions in a New Morrow Sodali Survey, BUS. WIRE (Mar.
10, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20200310005039/en/InstitutionalInvestors-Highlight-the-Growing-Importance-of-ESG-in-Investment-and-Proxy-Voting-Decisions-
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Much of this evidence comes from surveys of institutional investors; however,
unlike buying and selling decisions, proxy voting decisions provide a much
clearer and reliable picture of what is important to shareholders in this context.
This includes a much clearer and reliable picture of diversity commitments,
which may provide considerable support for materiality under Rule 14a-9. For
example, consider the commitments of State Street to address the issue of board
diversity. In 2021, State Street, which manages over $3 trillion, 200 pledged to
vote against the Chair of the Nominating & Governance Committee at companies
in the S&P 500 and FTSE 100 that do not disclose the racial and ethnic
composition of their boards. 201 And, in 2022, State Street pledged to vote against
the Chair of the Nominating & Governance Committee at companies in the S&P
500 and FTSE 100 that do not have at least one director from an underrepresented
community on their boards. 202 Thus, to State Street, disclosures regarding board
diversity would undoubtedly be important in determining how it will vote for
directors. And, unlike buying and selling, where the preference against negative
screening makes it exceedingly difficult to determine whether board diversity is
important to the reasonable investor, State Street’s adherence to this commitment
will be verifiable from its publicly available voting record.
State Street has made the most explicit commitment to addressing board
diversity among the largest fund managers; however, other fund managers are
quickly evolving on the issue as well. For instance, BlackRock’s 2021 proxy
guidelines state the following: “To the extent that a company has not adequately
accounted for diversity in its board composition within a reasonable timeframe,
based on our assessment, we may vote against members of the nominating
/governance committee for an apparent lack of commitment to board
effectiveness.” Likewise, Vanguard has stated that it may vote against directors
at companies “where progress on board diversity falls behind market norms and
expectations,” with particular focus on companies with no gender diversity or
ethnic diversity. 203 Though this language is not definitive, its significance will
be readily demonstrable by analyzing how major funds vote in director elections
at companies without a diverse board, the outcomes of which could provide
meaningful evidence of materiality for diversity statements under Rule 14a-9.
And, in fact, recent stewardship reports suggest that votes against directors for
lack of board diversity have already begun. 204 For example, BlackRock’s
in-a-New-Morrow-Sodali-Survey (“Survey results reveal that the broadly defined concept of ESG
will have a direct practical impact on shareholder meetings, proxy voting, engagement and the various
means by which investors fulfill their oversight and stewardship responsibilities.”).
200. See Nauman, supra note 42.
201. See Taraporevala, supra note 23.
202. Id.
203. Vanguard, A Continued Call for Boardroom Diversity, VANGUARD INVESTMENT
STEWARDSHIP INSIGHTS (Dec. 2020), https://about.vanguard.com/investment-stewardship/perspectivesand-commentary/ISBOARD_122020.pdf.
204. See, e.g., STATE ST. GLOB. ADVISORS, STEWARDSHIP REPORT 2020 32 (2021), https://
www.ssga.com/library-content/pdfs/asset-stewardship/asset-stewardship-report-2020.pdf (stating that
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stewardship report states that it voted against 1,569 directors due to lack of
diversity from July 2019 to June 2020. 205
The recommendations of proxy advisory firms provide additional support for
this argument. Proxy advisors are firms that specialize in analyzing company
information and issuing voting recommendations to their clients, which include
institutional investors and fund managers. 206 The theory is that institutional
investors are unable to effectively monitor all of the companies in their portfolios,
so they delegate this responsibility to proxy advisory firms who focus exclusively
on shareholder voting. ISS and Glass Lewis are the most prominent proxy
advisory firms, and together they control over 90% of the proxy service market,
providing recommendations to institutional investors with almost $20 trillion in
AUM. 207 It is well documented in the literature that negative recommendations
from proxy advisors influence their customers’ votes. 208 For instance, Shu finds
that a negative recommendation from ISS against a particular director’s election
makes ISS customers 21% more likely than other investors to vote against this
director. 209 Likewise, a negative recommendation from Glass Lewis makes its
customers 29% more likely to vote against the director. 210 Professors Alon Brav,
Matthew D. Cain & Jonathon Zytnick find that this effect is more pronounced
with the largest institutions, as a negative recommendation from ISS is associated

State Street voted against a director for lack of board diversity at 156 companies from March 2020 to
February 2021).
205. BLACKROCK, INVESTMENT STEWARDSHIP ANNUAL REPORT 13 (2020), https://
www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/publication/blk-annual-stewardship-report-2020.pdf. For
comparison, companies in the Russell 3000 have an average of 9 directors, corresponding to about
27,000 directors. Joseph E. Griesedieck, How Many Directors Does a Bord Need?, KORN FERRY,
https://www.kornferry.com/insights/articles/board-of-directors-size. In addition, approximately 400
Russell 3000 boards still do not have a female director and 8 out of 10 directors whose race is
identified are white. Matteo Tonello, The Conference Board, Corporate Board Practices in the
Russell 3000 and S&P 500, HARV. L. SCH. F. OF CORP. GOVERNANCE (Oct. 18, 2020), https://
corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/10/18/corporate-board-practices-in-the-russell-3000-and-sp-500/.
206. YVAN ALLAIRE, INSTITUTE FOR GOVERNANCE OF PRIVATE AND PUBLIC CORPORATIONS,
THE TROUBLING CASE OF PROXY ADVISORS: SOME POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 5 (2013).
207. See Shu, supra note 59 (“In 2017, ISS controlled 63 percent of the proxy service market
for mutual funds in the U.S. ($13.4 trillion assets from 134 fund families), and Glass Lewis controlled
28 percent of the market ($6.0 trillion assets from 27 fund families)”); Id.
208. See Andrew F. Tuch, Proxy Advisor Influence in a Comparative Light, 99 B.U. L. REV.
1459, 1464–66 (2019) (explaining the role and influence of US proxy advisors); see, e.g., Jennifer E.
Bethel & Stuart L. Gillan, The Impact of the Institutional and Regulatory Environment on Shareholder
Voting, 31 FIN MGMT. 29, 46 (2002) (finding that a negative ISS recommendation is associated with
13.6% to 20.6% fewer shares voting in favor of management proposals, depending on the topic of the
proposal); see Jie Cai, Jacqueline L. Garner & Ralph A. Walkling, Electing Directors, 64 J. FIN 2389,
2403 (2009) (directors facing uncontested elections who received negative ISS recommendations got
19% fewer votes).
209. Chong Shu, The Proxy Advisory Industry: Influencing and Being Influenced 2 (March 19,
2021) (working paper) (on file with USC Marshall School of Business Research Paper Series).
210. Id.
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with a 35 percentage point decrease in Big Three support. 211 This is particularly
relevant because the Big Three cast an average of about 25% of the votes at S&P
500 companies, a figure that could grow to above 40% within two decades. 212
Given this influence, proxy advisors’ recommendations can often determine the
outcome of elections. 213 Therefore, assessing proxy advisory firms’ approach to
diversity, which impacts how a large number of institutional shareholders cast
their votes, can provide evidence of diversity’s materiality to a reasonable
shareholder’s voting decision.
ISS’s and Glass Lewis’s 2021 recommendation policies reveal that proxy
advisory firms intend to take on a more active role in board diversity. For
example, in regards to gender diversity, ISS has indicated that, for companies in
the Russell 3000 or S&P 1500 indices, it will generally recommend voting against
or withholding votes from the chair of the nominating committee (or other
directors on a case-by-case basis) at companies where there are no women on the
company’s board. 214 Furthermore, in regard to ethnic and racial diversity,
effective for 2022, ISS will generally recommend voting against or withholding
from the chair of the nominating committee (or other directors on a case-by-case
basis) where the board has no apparent racially or ethnically diverse members. 215
Likewise, beginning in 2022, Glass Lewis will generally recommend voting
against the nominating committee chair of a board (and possibly additional
members of the nominating committee) that has fewer than two female
directors. 216 If these recommendations by ISS and Glass Lewis proliferate,
institutional investors with over $30 trillion in AUM will be advised to vote
against members of the board or nominating committee due to the fact that the
board does not meet a minimum level of diversity. Given the evidence that
negative recommendations have a sizable impact on director elections, the
policies of ISS and Glass Lewis add more strength to the argument that board
diversity is an important factor in determining how institutional investors vote.
These activities reflect a preference among institutional investors for
addressing board diversity, and ESG in general, via engagement and the proxy
process rather than by selling their shares. 217 BlackRock has acknowledged this

211. Alon Brav, Matthew D. Cain & Jonathon Zytnick, Retail Shareholder Participation in the
Proxy Process: Monitoring, Engagement, and Voting 32 (Euro. Corp. Governance Inst. Finance
Working Paper No. 637/2019, 2019).
212. Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, The Specter of the Giant Three, 99 B.U. L. REV. 721, 724
(2019).
213. Tuch, supra note 208, at 1466 n. 20 (“ISS advice has been cited as a decisive factor in a
number of major corporate events . . . .”).
214. INST’L S’HOLDER SERV., supra note 25, at 11–12.
215. Id.
216. See GLASS LEWIS, supra note 25, at 1.
217. See Patrick Temple-West, The ESG Investor’s Dilemma: To Engage or Divest?, FIN.
TIMES (Jan. 27, 2021), https://www.ft.com/content/814cbd2c-00db-41b7-91af-28435301a8a2
(describing the costs and benefits of divestiture versus engagement); see also Eleonora Broccardo,
Oliver Hart & Luigi Zingales, Exist vs. Voice (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst. Finance Working Paper
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preference, citing its large stakes and long investment horizon as motivating
factors. 218 However, the main reason is that engagement is the only option for
passive fund managers who cannot sell underperforming companies, a fact
BlackRock acknowledges. 219 There is also support for this proposition in the
literature, as Amel-Zadeh and Serafeim show that, among investment
professionals, negative screening (i.e., excluding companies from a portfolio
based upon ESG factors) is perceived as the least beneficial ESG investment
style. 220 This may be because asset managers favor “constructive dialogue.” 221
The more plausible explanation, however, is that investors don’t want to lose out
on “juicy” returns in legal, though controversial, companies. 222 Whatever the
reason, the commitments among institutional investors and proxy advisory firms
show that board diversity is clearly developing into a relevant issue in director
elections. And, as a result, disclosures regarding board diversity are becoming
increasingly important to the reasonable shareholders’ deliberations concerning
how to vote, lending credible support to materiality under Rule 14a-9.
2. Evidence of Rule 14a-9 Materiality from Retail Investors
Retail investors make up approximately 25% of the average public
company’s shareholder base, yet, due to low turnout rates, they only account for
about 10% of the votes at shareholders’ meetings, following a steady decline over
the past two decades. 223 This is hallmark substantiation of the well-documented

No. 694/2020, 2020) (finding that engagement is more effective than divestiture at pressuring firms
to act in socially responsible manner).
218. See Michelle Edkins, BlackRock, The Significance of ESG Engagement, in BLACKROCK
& CERES, 21ST CENTURY ENGAGEMENT: INVESTOR STRATEGIES FOR INCORPORATING ESG
CONSIDERATIONS INTO CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 4 (2017).
219. See id. But see Lucca De Paoli & Alastair Marsh, BlackRock, Vanguard Show Little Favor for
Shareholder ESG Votes, BLOOMBERG GREEN (Nov. 30, 2020, 9:01 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com
/news/articles/2020-12-01/blackrock-vanguard-show-little-favor-for-shareholder-esg-votes (finding that
BlackRock and Vanguard were among the least supportive institutions with respect to shareholder climate
resolutions, voting in favor of just 11% and 15% of climate resolutions in the 12 months through August
2020).
220. See Amir Amel-Zadeh & George Serafeim, Why and How Investors Use ESG Information:
Evidence from a Global Survey, 74 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 87, 88, 94 (2018); see also KRISTIAN HEUGH,
MARC FOX & EMILY TSUI, MORGAN STANLEY INVESTMENT MGMT., ESG AND SUSTAINABLE
INVESTING REPORT (2021), https://www.morganstanley.com/im/publication/insights/investmentinsights/ii_esgandsustainableinvestingreport_en.pdf?1615986451410 (stating that Morgan Stanley
does not apply ESG positive/negative screens to a benchmark).
221. See LARRY FINK, BLACKROCK, The Value of Our Voice in BLACKROCK & CERES, 21ST
CENTURY ENGAGEMENT: INVESTOR STRATEGIES FOR INCORPORATING ESG CONSIDERATIONS INTO
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2017) (“Constructive dialogue between investors and companies helps
business leaders be the best they can be.”).
222. Temple-West, supra note 217.
223. See Kobi Kastiel & Yaron Nili, In Search of “Absent” Shareholders: A New Solution to
Retail Investors’ Apathy, 41 DEL. J. OF CORP. L. 55, 57 (finding that retail shareholder turnout has
declined over the past two decades, despite technological, regulatory, and corporate governance
changes aimed at increasing retail shareholder participation). For an explanation of the mechanics of
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collective action problem in corporate governance. 224 This theory postulates that,
in a firm with widely dispersed share ownership, the cost to any one shareholder
to monitor and engage with the managers of the firm exceeds the incremental
benefit the shareholder would receive from improved management. 225 So,
theoretically, no one monitors or votes. While the drastic increase in institutional
investor ownership may address agency issues between management and
shareholders as a whole, since major institutional investors hold large enough
stakes to make some monitoring and engagement worth their while, 226 it does not
address the “rational apathy” 227 of retail investors, which still persists. 228 Now,
though share ownership is no longer widely dispersed, retail investors with
comparatively little skin in the game can look to the institutional investors to
handle the monitoring and engagement, including voting at shareholder meetings,
instead of incurring the costs of these activities themselves. 229 Therefore, the
collective action problem continues to explain retail investors’ low turnout rates,
and it is a reason why many consider retail investors a relatively unimportant
constituency in corporate elections. 230 Furthermore, in the context of the
materiality analysis under Rule 14a-9, it suggests that institutional investor
behavior is much more relevant to an analysis of the reasonable shareholder, as
it is the institutional investors who are meaningfully taking part in the corporate
governance mechanism that Rule 14a-9 is meant to protect. However, even if its
relevance is diminished due to low ownership percentages and turnout rates, retail

how retail shareholders take part in the shareholder voting process, see Brav, Cain & Zytnick, supra
note 211, at 7–11.
224. For the seminal work on the shareholder collective action problem, see ADOLPH A. BERLE
& GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
225. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE & IMAN ANABTAWI, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS: A
TRANSACTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 479–80 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 1st ed. 2017).
226. Bebchuk, Cohen & Hirst explain that the collective action problem that Berle & Means
claimed was inherent to the public corporation no longer approximates reality. See Bebchuk, Cohen
& Hirst, supra note 192, at 92. Rather, given the rise in institutional ownership, it is now likely to be
optimal for some institutional shareholders with large holdings to undertake the monitoring of
managers, referred to as “stewardship.” Id. at 93. However, there are also agency issues associated
with institutional investors as “stewards.” See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Index Funds
and the Future of Corporate Governance: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 2029
(2019) (demonstrating that index fund managers have strong incentives to underinvest in stewardship
and defer excessively to corporate managers).
227. See ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 390–92 (1986) (describing “rational apathy” as
the indifference a shareholder feels when they make the reasonable assumption that their vote will
not have any real influence on the conclusion of a corporate election); see also FRANK H.
EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 91 (1991).
228. See Bebchuk, Cohen & Hirst, supra note 192, at 93 (“[B]ecause the benefits of each
shareholder’s actions will be shared with fellow shareholders, it will still be privately optimal for each
shareholder to underspend on stewardship.”).
229. See id.
230. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Standing Voting Instructions: Empowering the Excluded Retail
Investor, 102 MINN. L. REV. 11, 11–12 (2017) (“no one cares very much about retail investor voting”).
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investor voting behavior must still be considered in an assessment of materiality
under Rule 14a-9.
Due to the perceived unimportance of retail investors in corporate elections
as currently constructed and a lack of reliable data, there is comparatively little
empirical analysis of retail shareholder voting. Rather, the literature focuses on
how to increase participation among retail shareholders in corporate
governance. 231 However, to appropriately analyze materiality under Rule 14a-9,
it is important to identify voting trends among retail shareholders, as it assists
with identifying what is important to the reasonable shareholder’s voting
decision. In order to address these issues, this section relies on Brav, Cain &
Zytnick’s 2019 study, which provides what is perhaps the only comprehensive
empirical analysis of retail shareholder voting behavior. 232
Brav, Cain & Zytnick reach a number of important conclusions that are
relevant to materiality under Rule 14a-9. First, and as previously established,
retail investors turnout at very low rates. 233 Second, retail shareholders differ
substantially from institutional investors in how they vote, exhibiting far less
sensitivity to ISS recommendations and generally less support for ESG. 234 Third,
and most importantly, retail shareholders exhibit a variety of different voting
behaviors based on the size their respective stakes, as large shareholder turn out
at higher rates and provide stronger support for management proposals, while
smaller shareholder turnout out at lower rates but tend to provide weaker support
for management proposals. 235 In addition, those with larger stakes tend to vote
against ESG proposals, while those with smaller stakes provide stronger support
for these proposals when they choose to engage. 236
As a result of this study, it is appropriate to view retail shareholders’ interests
as heterogenic. While retail shareholders as a whole may exhibit less support for
ESG, this is driven by retail shareholders with large stakes, as smaller
shareholders provide relatively strong support for ESG proposals. 237
Furthermore, while these large retail shareholders provide greater support for
management, smaller shareholders show more willingness to vote against
231. See, e.g., Kastiel & Nili, supra note 223, at 55 (proposing a system of highly-visible voting
default arrangements that would allow retail shareholders to choose from a menu of shortcuts); Fisch,
supra note 230, at 38 (advocating for the use of technology to make retail shareholder more efficient
and better informed); Christopher John Gulinello, The Retail Investor Vote: Mobilizing Rationally
Apathetic Shareholders to Preserve or Challenge the Board’s Presumption of Authority, 2010 UTAH
L. REV. 547 (2010) (advocating for the implementation of “retail investor voting instructions” to
mobilize retail investors by addressing the main reason why retail investors participate in elections at
such low rates – they are uninformed).
232. See Brav, Cain & Zytnick, supra note 211, at 3.
233. See id. at 21. And, in accordance with the collective action theory, retail shareholders at
larger firms, where their aggregate share ownership is smaller, turnout at lower rates than shareholders
at smaller firms, where their aggregate share ownership is greater. Id.
234. Id. at 22.
235. Id. at 4.
236. Id.
237. Id.
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management. 238 This heterogeneity makes it difficult to generalize what is
important to a retail investor’s voting decision, and it does not suggest that retail
investors consider the more specific ESG issue of board diversity important to
their voting decisions. However, given the growing, tangible efforts among
institutional investors and proxy advisors to address diversity by voting against
directors who do not nominate a diverse board, 239 it will be difficult for a court
to determine that a reasonable shareholder does not consider diversity important
when deciding whether to vote for members of the board of directors, even in
light of the lack of evidence from retail investors.
In summary, materiality under Rule 14a-9, with its focus on a reasonable
shareholder’s voting decision, Rule 14a-9 gives prospective plaintiffs a more
viable weapon than Rule 10b-5, which, in contrast, focuses on buying and selling
decisions. While investors are becoming increasingly outspoken in favor of
board diversity, there is little to no evidence to suggest that this is affecting
investors’ buying or selling decisions. In fact, it appears that, with respect to
portfolio allocation, investors’ statements in support of board diversity are cheap
talk. 240 By contrast, there is a growing body of strong evidence that investors
intend to address board diversity via shareholding voting instead. First,
institutional investors, who cast about 90% of the votes in director elections, are
beginning to make firm commitments to address board diversity by voting against
directors on boards that do not meet certain diversity thresholds. Second,
influential proxy advisors ISS and Glass Lewis are committing to make negative
recommendations against directors on boards that do not meet similar thresholds.
As these policies come into effect, it will be possible to monitor their impact,
likely providing strong evidence of the materiality of board diversity under Rule
14a-9. Finally, while there is not enough support for the proposition that retail
investors consider diversity important to voting decisions, these investors only
account for about 10% of the corporate electorate; therefore, their behaviors
should not override the growing body of evidence from institutional investors of
the materiality of board diversity to a reasonable shareholder’s voting decision.
As a result, these factors suggest that the materiality requirement will no longer
be a prohibitive hurdle for plaintiffs alleging false or misleading statements
related to board diversity if brought under Rule 14a-9.
III. BRINGING A RULE 14A-9 SUIT
While TSC Industries expressly adopted the materiality standard of Rule 14a9 for Rule 10b-5, 241 the foregoing analysis shows that there are inherent
differences between the materiality evaluations under these rules that can lead to
different outcomes, particularly in the context of ESG initiatives like diversity.
238.
239.
240.
241.

Id.
See supra Section II.C.1.
See supra Section II.B.
TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 439 (1976).
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This matter is especially relevant as plaintiffs’ lawyers begin targeting public
companies for allegedly false or misleading statements about diversity. Though
materiality is the main focus of this note, this section briefly assesses other
relevant differences between Rules 10b-5 and 14a-9 and considers the relief
plaintiffs can seek and the fees plaintiffs’ bar can receive under Rule 14a-9,
adding to the appeal of Rule 14a-9 as an option for bringing a securities fraud
claim for false or misleading diversity statements.
A. Other Relevant Distinctions Between Rules 10b-5 and 14a-9
Apart from materiality, two other major distinctions make Rule 14a-9 the best
option for plaintiffs pursuing claims against issuers for false or misleading
diversity statements. First, plaintiffs under Rule 10b-5 must plead scienter. 242
Specifically, plaintiffs must plead that the alleged misstatement related to
diversity was made with the “intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.” 243 In
contrast, there is no scienter requirement under Rule 14a-9. Although the
Supreme Court has not weighed in on the proper standard of liability under Rule
14a-9, there is general agreement among the Circuit Courts that negligence is the
proper standard. 244 As a result, under Rule 10b-5, a plaintiff would have to plead
that the issuer recklessly lied or misled investors with its statements relating to
diversity; but, under Rule 14a-9, a plaintiff would need to show only that the
issuer was negligent in including the false or misleading statements in its proxy
statement. Therefore, in this respect, there is clearly an advantage for plaintiffs
who bring such a claim under Rule 14a-9 rather than Rule 10b-5.
Second, the loss causation element is more difficult to prove under Rule 10b5 in the context of a false or misleading diversity statement. Under Rule 10b-5,
a plaintiff must plead that a company’s misrepresentation proximately caused
stock price movements according to which the plaintiff incurred actual economic
loss. 245 This is especially difficult for a plaintiff under these circumstances
because, as demonstrated in Section II, investors are not addressing diversity
issues by divesting from companies that underperform according to diversity
standards. As a result, false or misleading diversity disclosures are unlikely to
affect share price upon their release. 246 In contrast, under Rule 14a-9, plaintiffs
must plead that solicitation of proxies was an essential link in accomplishing the
defendant’s objective for which the proxies were solicited. 247 Under these
circumstances, Rule 14a-9 plaintiffs will have a strong argument because they
242. See supra notes 96–98 and accompanying text.
243. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n. 12 (1976).
244. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
245. See supra notes 102–03 and accompanying text.
246. This, of course, depends on degree. However, it is unlikely that the kind of misstatements
considered in this note would trigger a response in share price. As an example, a company that states
in its proxy statement something along the lines of “we are doing everything we can to get two diverse
directors on our board” would likely not affect share price.
247. See supra notes 118–120 and accompanying text.
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can show that the solicitation of proxies was clearly an essential link in
accomplishing the directors’ objective of getting elected and, therefore, the
inclusion of false or misleading statements regarding the company’s commitment
to board diversity injured shareholders’ voting rights. These crucial distinctions
indicate that, if plaintiffs can identify false or misleading statements regarding
board diversity in proxy statements (which will become increasingly likely as
companies are demanded and possibly mandated to provide more disclosure on
this issue), then Rule 14a-9 will be a tenable option.248
B. Injunctive Relief and Mootness Fees under Rule 14a-9
Given that it is difficult to ascertain damages as a result of false or misleading
diversity statements, plaintiffs pursuing a Rule 14a-9 claim may demand
injunctive relief in the form of a temporary restraining order. 249 Essentially, the
plaintiff would assert that a company’s proxy statement contains materially false
or misleading statements related to board diversity; therefore, the shareholders
meeting to elect directors should be enjoined unless and until the company
corrects the misstatements. This strategy is prevalent in the merger context, in
which public merger announcements frequently trigger boilerplate complaints
from plaintiffs making similar allegations and demands regarding false or
misleading disclosures in the proxy statement. 250 However, while these claims
are brought with growing frequency in federal court, 251 they are seldom litigated
past the complaint stage. Rather, the defendant usually offers to make a
corrective disclosure, which “moots” plaintiff’s claims. Then, plaintiffs’ lawyers
collect mootness fees, informally known in the industry as the “merger tax,” in

248. A natural question follows: why are the elements of Rule 14a-9 more favorable to plaintiffs
than the elements of Rule 10b-5? First, Rule 14a-9 protects corporate suffrage, which Congress
believed should be vigorously protected; therefore, plaintiff’s burden is relatively more
accommodating. See J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431 (1964) (stating that Rule14a-9
stemmed from the congressional belief that “(f)air corporate suffrage is an important right that should
attach to every equity security bought on a public exchange.”). Second, given that Rule 14a-9 typically
involves injunctive relief and supplemental disclosure as opposed to monetary damages like Rule
10b-5, the risk of extortionary litigation under Rule 14a-9 is less; and, therefore, stringent
requirements are not as necessary.
249. See Bainbridge & Anabtawi, supra note 225, at 496 (“Probably the most common remedy
in proxy litigation is some form of prospective relief, such as an ex ante injunction against the
shareholder vote”). Such a claim would invoke FRCP Rule 65 and its corresponding requirements for
temporary restraining orders. FED. R. CIV. P. 65.
250. See Roger Cooper, James Langston & Mark McDonald, Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP,
Doubt on Merger Disclosure Claims in a Rare Federal Court Decision, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE (July 12, 2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/07/12/doubt-on-merger-disclosureclaims-in-a-rare-federal-court-decision/; Matthew Solum, P.C., Kirkland & Ellis, LLP, The Uncertain Future
of M&A Litigation, SEC. REG. DAILY, WOLTERS KLUWER (Dec. 20, 2019), https://www.kirkland.com//media/publications/article/2019/12/the-uncertain-future-of-m_a-litigation/srd_uncertain-future-of-m_alitigation.pdf.
251. See Matthew D. Cain, Jill E. Fisch, Steven Davidoff Solomon & Randall S. Thomas,
Mootness Fees, 72 VAND. L. REV. 1777, 1780–81 (2019).
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compensation for the supposed benefit of the corrected disclosure. 252 Such a
strategy has been lucrative for plaintiffs’ bar. 253
While the election of directors has different features than the approval of a
merger, the same strategy may apply here. If successful, such claims would
effectively result in a “tax” on publicly traded corporations that do not comply
with board diversity thresholds, as these corporations would be the most
vulnerable targets of these claims. The prospect of litigation, corrective
disclosures, and mootness fees would add to the incentives of companies without
diverse boards to comply with the diversity standards demanded by investors and
potentially mandated in some form by the SEC. 254
CONCLUSION
This note assesses the implications of investors’ growing demands for
diversity disclosures on the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws.
Demands among investors for more diverse boards of directors, coupled with the
SEC’s reexamination of its policy towards mandatory ESG and diversity
reporting, makes more comprehensive and specific diversity disclosure
increasingly likely. This, in turn, makes public companies increasingly
vulnerable to securities fraud claims, where Rules 10b-5 and 14a-9 are
particularly relevant. As demonstrated, while the Supreme Court expressly
adopted the Rule 14a-9 standard of materiality for Rule 10b-5 these standards are,
in fact, not the same, and they lead to different outcomes in the context of board
diversity disclosures. Compared to Rule 10b-5, Rule 14a-9, with its focus on the
importance of disclosure on voting decisions, is a more favorable standard for
plaintiffs making claims against public companies for false or misleading
diversity statements, especially in an environment where investors appear much
more willing to address diversity via shareholder elections rather than by selling
their shares. This novel comparison between Rules 10b-5 and 14a-9 suggests that
materiality, which has traditionally been a major hurdle for plaintiffs making
ESG-related securities fraud, may not be such an impediment if brought under

252. See Cooper, Langston & McDonald, supra note 250. For an in-depth explanation and
analysis of mootness fees, see Cain, Fisch, Davidoff Solomon & Thomas, supra note 251.
253. See Solum, supra note 250.
254. There are a number of other relevant considerations regarding the effectiveness of the
merger strategy as applied to diversity-related misstatements in director elections. For instance,
differences in perceived strength between claims in the directors election context and claims in the
merger context may affect defendants’ motivations to avoid litigation and make corrective
disclosures. Furthermore, given that a corrective disclosure addressing diversity would essentially
equate to admitting that a defendant’s diversity plans were, at best, negligently misleading and, at
worst, lies, defendants may be less willing to make such corrections. But, given the general premise
established by the Supreme Court that “[shareholders] who have established a violation of the security
laws by their corporation and its officials should be reimbursed by corporation or its survivor for costs
of establishing the violation,” plaintiffs’ bar should be confident in receiving some sort of
compensation if it is determined that a company’s proxy statement is false or misleading. See Mills
v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 389–90 (1970).
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Rule 14a-9. Furthermore, the additional strategic strengths associated with a Rule
14a-9 claim for false or misleading diversity statements suggest that the prospect
of Rule 14a-9 litigation may incentivize companies that do not have diverse
boards to meet the minimum requirements demanded by the market and, perhaps
soon, by the SEC.

